Energy Security and a Molotov Mix…
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By Germán & Co.
Karlstad, Sweden | May 5, 2025
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Introduction: A Blackout in the Green Energy Leader
At midday on April 28, 2025, the Iberian Peninsula — ordinarily a showcase for renewable energy — went dark without warning. In a matter of seconds, Spain’s electricity grid lost an astonishing 15 gigawatts of power, about 60% of national demand. Lights flickered out from Madrid to Lisbon, trains and metros halted, communication networks failed, and daily life lurched to a standstill. Commuters were trapped in subway tunnels, 35,000 rail passengers had to be evacuated from stalled trains, and hospitals fell back on emergency generators to keep critical systems running. Both Spain and Portugal declared states of emergency, deploying thousands of police to maintain order. By the time power was gradually restored nearly a day later, this had become the worst blackout in Europe’s history.
The calamity struck a nation often praised for its aggressive shift to clean energy. Just 12 days earlier, on April 16, Spain had run its grid on 100% renewables for the first time ever, a milestone fueled by abundant spring winds and sun. Yet now, the same green energy mix is under scrutiny. Critics from industry and opposition ranks decried Spain’s “mix suicida” — a “suicidal mix” of power sources — alleging that an overreliance on intermittent renewables and the sidelining of conventional plants had left the grid dangerously unstable. Energy executives revealed they had warned the government a week before that the system was at risk, calling the situation “suicidal” if no action was taken. In their view, Spain’s rush to decarbonize had compromised the basic security of supply.
Spanish officials pushed back firmly against blaming renewable energy. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez insisted that “an excess of renewables” was not to blame for the collapse, calling such claims “lies or ignorance”. The grid operator Red Eléctrica de España (REE) likewise maintained that solar and wind technologies “are already stable” and operate safely, indicating that similar renewable generation levels on past days had caused no issue. Nonetheless, the blackout has triggered searching questions across Europe about the trade-offs between rapid decarbonization and grid reliability. As the EU presses ahead with ambitious climate targets — and even weighs a full ban on Russian gas imports by 2027 — Spain’s ordeal is a cautionary tale. It lays bare the technical stresses of managing a high-renewables grid, the policy oversights in ensuring backup and balance, and the geopolitical urgency of fortifying energy security in an era of tumultuous transition.
This article delves into the root causes and broader context of the April 28 blackout. We examine how a confluence of technical factors — grid instability, surging renewable output, and an ageing power infrastructure — combined with policy choices by Spain and the EU, set the stage for disaster. We trace the historical evolution of Spain’s energy mix, from a carbon-intensive past to today’s green ambitions, and how the phase-out of coal and nuclear has intersected with the boom in wind and solar. We assess the EU’s role in shaping national energy trajectories through initiatives like Fit for 55 and REPowerEU, and how these frameworks attempt to reconcile decarbonization with resilience. Finally, we explore the geopolitical dimension: Europe’s drive to sever its dependence on Russian gas and the new vulnerabilities and diplomatic realignments that come with that pivot. Throughout, we critically evaluate the “suicidal mix” charge — is the current balance between clean energy and stability as perilous as claimed, and what can be done to better manage the green transition without the lights going out?
Midday Meltdown: Anatomy of the April 28 Blackout
At 12:33 p.m. on Monday, April 28, Spain’s grid suffered a rapid-fire sequence of failures that engineers liken to a cardiac arrest in the power system. According to REE’s preliminary report, the crisis unfolded in three pulses. First, a sudden loss of generation occurred in the south of Spain — later estimated as a dip of several gigawatts — causing an “oscillation” in the grid. The system managed to right itself after this initial jolt. However, mere 1.5 seconds later, a second, larger generation loss hit, this time in the southwest. This double blow proved too much: within another few seconds, safety mechanisms tripped the major interconnection between Spain and France, isolating the Iberian grid. What followed was a catastrophic cascading collapse: as frequency and voltage plummeted outside safe bounds, power plants and substations across Spain and Portugal automatically disconnected to protect their equipment. In just a 5-second span, 15 GW of generation vanished from the Spanish grid, and an additional 5 GW dropped in Portugal. The peninsula had effectively “flatlined” to “el cero” – zero power, a condition so extreme that grid operators refer to it in quasi-apocalyptic terms.
The immediate cause of the blackout remains under investigation, but emerging evidence points to an imbalance triggered by renewable power volatility. Spain’s Energy Minister confirmed that 19 seconds before the collapse, a significant loss of generation occurred in the south of the country. This could indicate a large solar farm or other plant tripping offline. REE has identified “two incidents of power generation loss, probably from solar plants, in Spain’s southwest” that initiated the instability. These regions — Extremadura and western Andalusia — are known for thousands of megawatts of new solar capacity and were already considered “the most stressed nodes of the grid”, often requiring technical curtailments (forced shutdowns of solar plants when local generation exceeds carrying capacity). It appears that on April 28, a combination of exceptional solar output and insufficient local absorption led a critical node to fail. When that substation or node went down, it sent shockwaves across the network. With the grid’s delicate supply-demand balance upset, frequency plunged below the standard 50 Hz, leading generators across Iberia and even one in France to disconnect in unison. The result was a textbook case of a cascading outage in a highly interconnected system.
Notably, demand at the time was modest and supply ample. This was not a typical blackout caused by a power shortage, but seemingly the opposite — an oversupply and management failure. In fact, just before the crash, Spain was basking in a renewable bonanza: solar power made up 53–60% of generation, wind about 11–12%, while nuclear and gas together provided only ~15%. Midday spring conditions — bright sun, moderate demand — led to extremely high solar penetration. Ironically, too much supply can disrupt power grids much like too little supply. If generation greatly exceeds consumption, grid frequency surges; conversely, if a chunk of generation suddenly vanishes (as seems to have happened), frequency can crash. Both scenarios risk tripping protective devices. On April 28, grid operators were effectively juggling a surplus — Spain was even exporting power at that hour — when the balance snapped. As Transport Minister Óscar Puente described a precursor incident, “excessive voltage in the network triggered disconnections to protect substations”. That occurred on April 22, when minor power cuts foreshadowed the bigger catastrophe to come.
Initial rumors grasped at exotic explanations. Early media reports (erroneously attributed to Portugal’s REN) spoke of a “rare atmospheric phenomenon” — an “induced atmospheric vibration” — where sudden temperature swings cause oscillations in high-voltage lines. In theory, sharp weather changes can make transmission lines oscillate and de-sync a grid. But as experts noted, the weather that day was calm and “really nice”. Both REE and REN have since ruled out meteorological events, cyberattacks, and human error as primary causes. The consensus is shifting toward an internal grid instability issue — essentially, a technical chain reaction rooted in how generation and network protections were configured.
One key focus is the protective relays and protocols governing Spain’s grid. It has emerged that REE had sought to update its grid protection criteria to account for the “massive entry of renewables” but was awaiting government approval for those changes. The existing protections dated from 1996, an era of predominantly centralized thermal power. REE’s proposal warned that with so many inverters and distributed solar feeding in, certain traditional safeguards might not behave as expected. For example, a substation set to trip at certain thresholds might do so too broadly in a high-renewables scenario, causing an outage to ripple farther. Unfortunately, that revised safety protocol was not yet in place when the events of April 28 hit. Indeed, REE acknowledged that high renewable penetration in a region could overwhelm the old protection system, possibly exactly what occurred in the congested solar hub of Extremadura/Andalusia. Essentially, the grid’s circuit breakers were calibrated for yesterday’s power system, not today’s. The result was that when stresses arose, the system could not “absorb” the perturbations and instead collapsed wholesale.
Spain’s grid operator and crews deserve credit that the “black start” recovery — re-energizing a dead grid — was executed in hours, not days. ENTSO-E, the European network of grid operators, praised the rapid recovery; by late on April 28, REE had gradually reconnected generation and begun restoring power region by region. Still, the socio-economic costs were immense. Analysts estimate the blackout may have shaved €1.6–4.5 billion off Spain’s GDP. Factories like Volkswagen’s Navarra plant lost days of production, small businesses saw inventories spoiled, and three lives were tragically lost to carbon monoxide poisoning when desperate victims ran generators indoors. The political fallout was swift: opposition parties lambasted the government for complacency and demanded an independent inquiry. A National Security Council meeting was convened under the King’s chairmanship to investigate causes, alongside judicial probes into potential sabotage. While no evidence of foul play has emerged, the blackout has exposed vulnerabilities in Spain’s grid operations that must be addressed. As one energy expert succinctly said, “you’ve got to get the engineering right” no matter the energy source. Next, we turn to how Spain built an energy mix that, for all its green laurels, came to teeter on a knife’s edge.
The Renewable Revolution Meets an Ageing Infrastructure
Spain’s energy mix has undergone a dramatic transformation over the past two decades — a journey from fossil-fueled dependency to a renewable energy trailblazer. In the early 2000s, Spain was heavily reliant on coal and imported gas, with a fleet of nuclear reactors from the 1980s providing roughly a fifth of its electricity. That began to change rapidly as Spain embraced wind and solar power. Aggressive government policies in the 2000s, notably generous feed-in tariffs for renewables, spurred a boom. By 2010, Spain had become the world’s 4th-largest wind power producer, and its sunny plains were dotted with solar farms feeding into the grid. This early push was not without pain — a solar PV investment bubble in 2007-2008 ended with a bust when subsidies were abruptly cut, leaving investors reeling. Nonetheless, the groundwork was laid for a cleaner energy system.
By 2023, wind and solar accounted for over one-third of Spain’s electricity: wind supplied about 22% and solar 15% of total generation. Together with hydro and other renewables, 56% of Spain’s power in 2024 came from renewable sources. This is a remarkable leap from just a decade prior; in 2010, renewables (mostly wind and hydro) were nearer to 25% of the mix. Spain’s National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) set ever higher targets, aiming for 74% renewable electricity by 2030, a goal since revised upward to 81% by 2030 to align with EU ambitions. The ultimate vision is 100% carbon-free power by 2050. In parallel, Spain has virtually phased out coal: it shut its last domestic coal mines in 2019 and has closed most coal-fired plants or scheduled them for closure well before 2030. This was facilitated by EU climate policy and the rising cost of CO₂ allowances, which made coal uneconomic. Oil-fired power is long gone except in islands, and natural gas was intended as the bridge — Spain built a fleet of combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) in the 2000s to provide flexible power and replaced a lot of oil use with gas in heating and industry.
The nuclear sector, meanwhile, is on borrowed time. Spain’s seven nuclear reactors, first connected between 1968 and 1988, still provide around 20% of electricity in a typical year. But they are aging, and the government’s roadmap calls for shutting all nuclear plants by 2035. The phase-out is slated to begin in 2027 with the two reactors at Almaraz — the very site whose downtime became a flashpoint during the recent crisis. (In a twist of timing, both Almaraz units were offline on April 28, having been temporarily shut “due to abundant wind energy making operations uneconomic” just days prior. One unit was still down during the blackout, meaning nuclear was not at full strength that day.) The planned nuclear exit reflects political priorities (the current left-wing coalition is anti-nuclear) and economic realities (reactors face high upgrade costs and competition from cheap renewables). But it also removes a major source of steady, dispatchable power from the system. Former REE chairman Jordi Sevilla warned in January that “shutting down the nuclear plants may put electricity supply at risk”. Industry voices echoed that losing nuclear’s inertia and capacity “reduces the grid's balancing capabilities,” increasing the risk of incidents.
This evolving mix — soaring renewables, shrinking baseload — has left Spain’s power infrastructure straining to adapt. The high-voltage grid and control systems were originally designed for centralized generation feeding passive demand centers. Now, Spain has to integrate thousands of distributed solar installations (many under 1 MW) and wind farms spread across its geography. REE has candidly admitted that it “lacked information from smaller plants to be able to operate in real time”. In other words, the system operator doesn’t always have a clear picture of what myriad rooftop panels or small solar farms are doing moment-to-moment. This complicates balancing efforts. In its latest annual report (Feb 2025), REE’s parent company Redeia flagged the insufficient visibility and controllability of these new generators as a serious operational challenge. It warned of an “increased risk of disconnections due to the high penetration of renewables without the technical capacities necessary for an adequate response to disturbances”. Tragically, that statement proved prophetic two months later.
Another pressure point is energy storage — or the lack thereof. Spain relies predominantly on pumped hydro storage (using off-peak power to pump water uphill, then releasing it to generate electricity at peak times) for bulk energy storage. It has several large pumped hydro facilities (like the Cortes-La Muela plant) and is expanding others. But the total storage is limited and subject to water availability. Battery storage deployment is only just beginning in earnest; a few hundred megawatts of batteries are operational or planned, tiny compared to peaks of 40-45 GW demand. During the midday solar peaks, when generation can far exceed consumption, excess power often has nowhere to go. Without sufficient storage or export capacity, the grid operator resorts to curtailment — ordering solar/wind farms to shut off. Curtailment wastes carbon-free energy and can undermine the economics for producers, but it is a necessary safeguard to keep the grid stable when flexibility runs out. The south-west regions where April’s problems originated were known to experience frequent curtailments for exactly this reason. It’s a sign that grid expansion hasn’t kept pace with renewable expansion. New transmission lines and substations to carry solar from rural Extremadura to distant demand centers (Madrid, Barcelona, etc.) are often bogged down by permitting delays and local opposition. Thus, bottlenecks form, where too much generation is concentrated on too weak a grid — a situation ripe for instability if not carefully managed.
Compounding matters, many of Spain’s gas plants have been underutilized, raising concerns about their future availability. The surge in renewables and a lull in demand growth meant that for much of the 2010s, Spain’s gas-fired stations ran at low capacity factors (only a fraction of their potential output). Several were mothballed. While this is good for emissions, it means some flexible plants may not be financially viable to remain on standby. Spain has implemented “capacity payments” in the past — paying plant owners to keep capacity available even if not often used — but these mechanisms have been contentious under EU market rules. Nonetheless, having gas turbines ready to ramp up or down is critical to buffer wind/solar swings. On April 28, however, virtually all Spain’s gas and coal units were offline or at minimum load, since there was ample renewable energy and low marginal prices. When the grid frequency nosedived, there was scant “spinning reserve” from thermal plants that could instantly respond. Carlos Cagigal, an energy consultant, noted that “Spain’s nuclear plants weren’t operating at the time, meaning all of its electricity was coming from renewables feeding saturated substations. When one of those substations failed and there wasn’t adequate backup, safety protocols kicked in”. In short, the conventional plants that might have helped cushion the blow were either switched off for economic reasons or already tripped by the disturbance.
To be clear, Spain has not neglected grid improvements entirely. It has been investing in solutions like synchronous condensers (large spinning machines that do not generate power but provide stabilizing inertia and voltage support). In 2022, REE installed new synchronous condensers in the Balearic Islands and in the mainland grid specifically to boost inertia in high-renewable scenarios. Spain also has fast-reacting hydro plants that can ramp up output quickly. And the milestone of 100% renewable operation on April 16 was achieved without incident, showing that the grid can handle such mixes under the right conditions. Yet the blackout indicates that specific critical nodes and contingency plans were overstretched. It has forced a reckoning: Is the infrastructure robust enough for the renewable era? The government had forecast €52 billion of investment by 2030 to upgrade the grid (for new demand like data centers and electric vehicles and integrating renewables). The events of April 28 suggest this upgrade agenda needs to accelerate. As we’ve seen, Spain’s renewable revolution is impressive and irreversible — but it now faces the complex reality that wires, transformers, software, and regulations must catch up to the new generation profile. Otherwise, avoidable reliability crises could undermine the achievements in clean energy.
Brussels’ Hand: EU Climate Policy and Grid Resilience
Spain’s energy trajectory doesn’t exist in a vacuum — it is deeply entwined with European Union policies and targets. Over the last few years, the EU has unleashed a flurry of climate initiatives that push member states toward greener, more integrated energy systems. Foremost among these is the “Fit for 55” package, unveiled in 2021, which aims to cut EU-wide greenhouse gas emissions 55% by 2030 (relative to 1990). To hit that mark, Brussels significantly raised the bar for renewables: the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive now targets about 42.5% of total final energy from renewables by 2030 (up from 32% previously), and roughly two-thirds of EU electricity is expected to be renewable by 2030. For a country like Spain, rich in sun and wind, this was an invitation to go even faster. Spain duly increased its national targets – hence the current 81% renewable electricity goal for 2030, one of the most ambitious in Europe. EU climate policy also led Spain to adopt a national Climate Change and Energy Transition Law (2021), which enshrines a 100% renewable electricity aim by mid-century and bans new oil, gas, and coal permits. The direction from Brussels has been clear: decarbonize aggressively.
Alongside decarbonization, the EU pushes for market integration and cross-border interconnections. The logic is that a unified European power grid can better accommodate renewables by sharing energy across regions – sunny Spain can export solar at noon, windy North Sea power can flow to doldrum areas, etc. For years, the EU has prodded Spain (and Portugal) to increase their interconnection with the rest of Europe. A decade ago, the European Council set a goal that each member state should have interconnection capacity equivalent to at least 10% of its installed generation (later raising it to 15% by 2030). Spain, however, remains an “energy island” of sorts; its links over the Pyrenees to France are limited to about 2.8 GW, roughly <3% of its generation capacity. This is far below the 10% goal. Spain’s energy minister Sara Aagesen emphasized after the blackout that “it is necessary to reinforce interconnections via France,” noting the imbalance between Europe’s 10% target and the current 3% reality. Poor interconnection means that when Spain has excess renewable power, it cannot easily export enough of it to neighbors (and vice versa for shortages). During the April 28 incident, the limited France link was actually a double-edged sword — it transmitted disturbances that caused a French plant to trip, then the link shut itself off to protect the broader European grid. Greater interconnection in the long run will enhance stability (larger grid “pool” to absorb shocks), but it requires France’s cooperation, which historically has been lukewarm due to concerns about its own grid and market impacts.
The EU also provides funding for cross-border infrastructure and smart grids through instruments like the Connecting Europe Facility and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (the latter channeled billions into member states’ green projects post-COVID). Spain has been a beneficiary, using EU funds to bolster its grid and roll out innovations (like digital grid management systems and EV charging networks). Brussels has supported projects to link Spain’s grid more tightly with Portugal (which is now well integrated with Spain) and to study new links to France. A major project now underway is a submarine power cable through the Bay of Biscay to connect Spain and France by 2027, doubling interconnection capacity. There is also the planned “Celtic Interconnector” linking Spain to Ireland via France. These efforts underscore that EU energy policy prizes both decarbonization and interconnection as twin pillars of security.
However, one area where EU policy has arguably lagged is in explicitly mandating reliability measures alongside renewables deployment. While bodies like ENTSO-E conduct Europe-wide grid adequacy assessments and issue warnings, the implementation is left to national authorities. In April, just weeks before the blackout, ENTSO-E cautioned that the scheduled closure of Spain’s Almaraz nuclear plant units starting 2027 “will increase the risks of blackouts” on the Iberian grid. REE responded publicly that it foresaw “no risk of a blackout” and could guarantee stable supply — a statement now painfully ironic. The EU does enforce some technical rules (like requirements for grid operators to have reserve margins and emergency plans), and through the Electricity Regulation it has frameworks for capacity mechanisms if needed to ensure supply. Spain in fact secured EU approval in 2019 for a capacity market to keep some gas plants available for backup. But even capacity markets only help if they are used robustly and if the units can physically respond fast enough to events like April 28’s. The EU’s broader approach has been to trust that market signals plus prudent national planning will maintain reliability. After this event, that approach may be revisited, with calls for stronger regional coordination on grid stability. Notably, EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson and her successor (Dan Jørgensen, who took office in 2024) have stressed that grid resilience must go “hand in hand” with the green transition and have launched an EU-level investigation into the blackout’s causes. This suggests Brussels recognizes a need to fine-tune policies so that “Fit for 55” does not unintentionally result in “unfit grids”.
Another crucial EU initiative is REPowerEU, devised in 2022 in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. REPowerEU’s immediate goal was to wean Europe off Russian fossil fuels — especially piped natural gas — as quickly as possible, and to strengthen the bloc’s energy autonomy. For electricity, this translated into an accelerated rollout of renewables and hydrogen. The European Commission urged member states to “double solar photovoltaic capacity by 2025” and set massive targets for 2030 (600 GW of solar and 510 GW of wind EU-wide). It also promoted heat pumps and electrification to cut gas demand. Spain enthusiastically embraced these goals, seeing an opportunity to leverage its sun and wind resources. Indeed, Spain updated its NECP in 2023 to target 76 GW of solar PV by 2030 (nearly doubling from ~39 GW prior target). All this is supported by EU recovery funds — Spain’s recovery plan allocated billions for renewable energy, grid upgrades, and hydrogen projects. Crucially, REPowerEU also calls for streamlining permits for renewables, as bureaucratic delays were a bottleneck. Spain moved to simplify permitting, which means the pace of solar and wind farm commissioning is set to increase further in coming years.
The European dimension also encompasses shared challenges of grid management that transcend borders. For instance, in January 2021 Europe narrowly averted a continent-wide blackout when a disturbance in Croatia split the EU grid into east and west; only quick action and support from neighbors prevented collapse. That incident, like the Spain blackout, underscored how interconnected Europe’s fates are. Following it, ENTSO-E and EU regulators pushed for better real-time data exchange and cooperation among TSOs (Transmission System Operators). The Iberian blackout will likely accelerate such efforts. We might see, for example, EU guidelines on mandatory inertia or fast-frequency response requirements for systems as renewable penetration grows beyond certain thresholds. Already, the EU’s Network Codes (technical rules) have standards for generators to provide frequency control and fault ride-through. But the technology is evolving: grid-forming inverters, advanced battery systems, and even flywheel storage can emulate many stability services of thermal plants. The EU could incentivize deployment of these across member states, ensuring that high-renewables countries like Spain adopt cutting-edge solutions to keep frequency stable. In essence, Europe must marry its climate ambitions with a continent-spanning upgrade of grid robustness. The blackout has made it clear that achieving a 55% emissions cut must go hand in hand with a “system security” agenda, or else public confidence in the energy transition could falter.
Spain, for its part, often points out that European solidarity is a two-way street. During the 2021-2022 energy price crisis, Spain and Portugal implemented the so-called “Iberian exception” — a temporary EU-approved gas price cap to keep electricity prices down, acknowledging their weak interconnection meant Spanish consumers couldn’t benefit from French nuclear or German coal in a crunch. Conversely, Spain has offered to help Europe by leveraging its infrastructure: it has Europe’s largest LNG import capacity and had proposed new gas pipelines over the Pyrenees (MidCat) to supply central Europe with non-Russian gas. While France blocked MidCat, an alternative H2Med pipeline for green hydrogen exports from Spain to France (and onward) is now being advanced with EU blessing. This speaks to a future where Spain becomes not just a consumer of EU energy policy but a supplier of energy to Europe — potentially exporting its excess solar power via new wires or shipping green hydrogen made from its renewables. The EU’s vision of collective energy security means Spain’s grid issues matter beyond its borders. A stable, well-integrated Spanish grid could be a powerhouse that helps lights stay on in Paris or Berlin one day, just as today France’s nuclear or Germany’s wind can help Spain when needed. Thus, the EU’s climate and energy integration policies are deeply interlinked in Spain’s case: success in one (clean energy rollout) must be matched by success in the other (cross-border balancing and support).
In summary, EU policies like Fit for 55 and REPowerEU have propelled Spain to its green vanguard position, providing targets, funding, and market frameworks. But policy makers in Brussels did not fully anticipate the operational stresses at the grid edge. The Spanish blackout is likely to influence EU strategy going forward: expect increased emphasis on grid investment, storage, and resilience measures across all member states. As one Financial Times editorial put it, these blackouts are a “wake-up call” that **governments must invest in electricity resilience “alongside the green transition”. The next section will examine the geopolitical overlay — how the broader drive to end reliance on Russian gas and other external fuels makes the task of balancing decarbonization with reliability even more urgent.
Geopolitical Crosswinds: Russian Gas, Algeria, and Europe’s Energy Security
The year 2022 was a turning point for Europe’s energy geopolitics. Russia’s war on Ukraine led to what European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called a “tectonic shift” in EU energy strategy. Virtually overnight, the EU resolved to terminate decades of reliance on Russian hydrocarbons – a dependence that had supplied 40% of EU gas, 25% of its oil, and nearly half its coal. The EU banned Russian coal imports in mid-2022 and moved to phase out Russian oil (with an embargo on seaborne oil and G7 price cap). Gas was trickier: while no immediate ban was imposed (owing to the risk of winter shortages in countries like Germany and Italy), the EU’s REPowerEU plan set the course to “phase out Russian gas” completely by 2027. Unprecedented efforts went into cutting Russian gas: pipeline flows from Russia plummeted by almost 80% between 2021 and 2023 as Gazprom throttled deliveries and Europe refused to open new contracts. By 2025, Russian gas constitutes only a few percent of EU imports, down from the lion’s share pre-war. In its place, Europe turned to a mix of emergency measures: record imports of LNG from suppliers like the United States, Qatar, and Nigeria; increased pipeline gas from Norway, North Africa, and Azerbaijan; and – critically – demand reduction and fuel switching, which saw coal plants temporarily returned to service and industry curtail usage.
Spain found itself in a somewhat paradoxical position in this upheaval. On one hand, Spain was one of the least dependent EU countries on Russian gas, typically sourcing less than 10% of its gas from Russia (its primary suppliers being Algeria and LNG from various origins). On the other hand, Spain holds some of Europe’s keys to energy diversification. It has six large LNG terminals (about one-third of the EU’s LNG import capacity) and was willing to act as a gas entry point to the continent. The Spanish government advocated for the revival of the MidCat gas pipeline over the Pyrenees to carry gas (and later hydrogen) northwards, as a matter of EU solidarity. Though France blocked MidCat, under EU pressure and German lobbying, a compromise “H2Med” pipeline dedicated to hydrogen was agreed, indicating a longer-term vision of Iberia as a green hydrogen hub feeding Europe.
In the short term, Europe’s Russian gas exit put stress on all countries to ensure energy security. Gas prices spiked to record highs in 2022, leading to exorbitant electricity prices in Spain’s market as well (until the “Iberian exception” cap kicked in). High gas prices incentivized even more renewable energy deployment, reinforcing Spain’s push to get off fossil gas for power generation. However, it also meant gas-fired plants remained critical as backup to avoid blackouts during the transition. Europe asked countries to save energy; Spain mandated cooling and heating limits in public buildings to conserve gas, for example. By winter 2022/23, an unusually warm season and full gas storage spared Europe from crisis. But had that winter been harsh, Spain too might have needed to ship gas to France or elsewhere under EU solidarity mechanisms (the EU has rules for one country to assist another with gas in emergencies). It highlighted that Spain’s security is linked to Europe’s and vice versa.
Another geopolitical wrinkle is Spain’s relationship with Algeria, its historical gas supplier. Spain receives Algerian gas via the Medgaz undersea pipeline to Almería and via LNG shipments. Until late 2021, a second pipeline (Maghreb-Europe) ran through Morocco, but that was closed after Algeria cut ties with Morocco over the Western Sahara dispute. In 2022, Spain angered Algeria by shifting its Western Sahara policy closer to Morocco’s position. Algeria responded by threatening to cut gas exports and raised prices for Spain. Though it didn’t stop pipeline flows (doing so would have hurt Algeria’s revenue and reputation with the EU), it did illustrate how geopolitical disputes can endanger energy supply even among “friendly” partners. Spain had to reassure that any gas it re-exported to Morocco via reverse flow was not Algerian origin. The episode underlined the importance of Spain’s LNG infrastructure – which gives it flexibility to source gas globally if pipeline supplies falter. And it drove home that diversification of supply (a core REPowerEU principle) is not just about Russia, but about not being too beholden to any single supplier. Spain in effect diversified by importing more LNG from the U.S. (which by 2023 became Spain’s top gas source, as it did for the EU broadly).
From a diplomacy standpoint, the EU’s pivot away from Russia has drawn Spain and the rest of Europe into new energy alliances. The United States emerged as a key partner, dramatically boosting LNG exports to Europe – to the point that over half of U.S. LNG in 2022 went to the EU. This created some frictions (accusations of Americans profiting from high prices) but overall solidified transatlantic ties. The EU (with Spain’s support) also struck cooperation deals with countries like Qatar, Egypt, and Israel to secure LNG and future hydrogen. In mid-2023, for instance, Spain hosted a summit with African and European leaders on green hydrogen cooperation, highlighting its aspiration to be a bridge between North Africa’s vast solar potential and Europe’s clean energy needs. Here, geopolitics and the green transition intersect: Europe’s need for non-Russian energy is accelerating investments in renewable projects in North Africa (like Morocco’s solar farms or potential Algerian green hydrogen) which could supply Europe – possibly via Spain as the landing point.
All these changes put a premium on infrastructure readiness. If Spain is to import LNG at full throttle and potentially export surplus power or hydrogen, it needs pipelines, wires, and conversion facilities. Some of this is underway: apart from H2Med, Spain is expanding interconnectors with Portugal and building new internal power lines to handle renewables. But time is short and the scale is large. In the interim, Europe’s gas crisis taught a lesson that also applies to electricity: strategic reserves and buffers are crucial. The EU mandated that each country fill gas storage to 80-90% before winter; Spain complied by filling its modest storage (it has less storage than central Europe due to more LNG flexibility). Similarly, one could argue for capacity reserves in electricity – ensuring a buffer of dispatchable power or demand-response that can be called upon in emergencies. Spain’s blackout is prompting such discussions. After all, had the April 28 collapse been prolonged for days, it would have required massive mutual aid — perhaps emergency power imports from neighbors or even deploying diesel gensets at scale — akin to how EU nations help each other in gas crises. That hypothetical underscores that electricity security is national but also increasingly European.
Another geopolitical factor is how energy dependencies shape diplomacy. Spain’s commitment to closing nuclear plants by 2035, for example, aligns with its domestic politics, but also spares it from relying on imported uranium or on extending plants that might need Russian nuclear fuel services (as some Eastern European reactors did until recently). However, it does make Spain potentially more reliant on imported technology like batteries from Asia or electrolyzers for hydrogen. The EU is cognizant of this and through its Green Deal Industrial Plan is pushing for domestic production of clean tech (batteries, solar panels, etc.) to avoid simply trading one dependency (Russian gas) for another (Chinese solar panels or rare earth materials). Spain, with its automotive industry, is investing in battery gigafactories and EV production as part of EU funding programs. So the concept of energy security now extends to supply chains for the energy transition. Spain’s “suicidal mix” critics sometimes point to the irony that rushing into renewables could make Europe dependent on Chinese manufacturing. The counterargument is that renewables and electrification free Europe from fuel geo-politics, and manufacturing can be localized over time.
In summary, the geopolitical storm around Russian gas has, somewhat counterintuitively, reinforced Europe’s green momentum (to eliminate fossil fuel leverage) while also exposing infrastructure gaps. Spain’s blackout occurred against this backdrop of Europe redefining energy security. Where once “energy security” in Europe meant diversifying oil and gas supply routes, today it equally means ensuring the stability of a renewables-heavy grid. Both dimensions intersect in Spain. The EU’s move to ban Russian gas has given Spain a bigger role in continental energy strategy, but it also leaves no safety net of fossil slack — everyone is pushing the envelope to replace gas with wind, solar, and efficiency. That raises the stakes for getting the transition right. The Iberian blackout sent shockwaves through EU capitals as a warning: even as we cut ties with the Kremlin’s gas, we must keep our house in order. In the next section, we’ll confront head-on the “suicidal mix” critique and ask whether Spain (and by extension Europe) has struck the right balance between decarbonization and stability, or whether a course correction is needed to avoid future calamities.
“A Suicidal Mix?”: Balancing Decarbonization with Stability
In the aftermath of the blackout, the phrase “mezcla suicida” – “suicidal mix” – has been on the lips of many Spanish energy veterans. It captures the fear that Spain’s current blend of energy sources is dangerously unbalanced, risking system collapse. What exactly is this critique? In essence, industry experts and opposition voices argue that Spain has pushed renewable integration faster than it has built in stabilizing measures. By aggressively retiring coal and planning to shutter nuclear, while not yet having sufficient storage, backup, or grid reinforcements, Spain (they say) has created a precarious situation: a grid highly dependent on weather-dependent generation that can neither be fully controlled nor easily backed up at all times. “Blackouts can happen anywhere, but this type of thing tends not to happen when you have more baseload like nuclear on the grid,” observed Seth Grae, a U.S. nuclear industry executive, adding pointedly, “the more your sources are intermittent, the greater the risk”. Those sympathetic to this view note that at the moment of crisis, zero fossil or nuclear plants were truly online to help – essentially 100% renewable generation was feeding Spain when it went dark. To critics, this looks like proof that the mix itself was at fault.
Spain’s major electric companies had already sounded alarms. On April 22, in a meeting with Prime Minister Sánchez, private utility executives warned that allowing half of Spain’s nuclear fleet to be offline while surging renewables constituted a “suicidal” risk to grid security. They urged action and reportedly got a slow response. The conservative opposition (PP) has seized on the blackout to call for reconsidering the nuclear shutdown plan. Even the far-right VOX party — which has long opposed Spain’s climate policies — trumpeted the event as evidence of “the importance of a balanced energy mix” rather than an all-renewable approach. These critics advocate keeping dispatchable plants (nuclear, gas) alive longer, investing in grid robustness, and pacing the renewable rollout to match infrastructure development. In their view, Spain’s rush has been politically driven (to meet EU climate goals and please a pro-renewables electorate) but not matched with the less-glamorous work of grid prep.
How fair is this “suicidal mix” accusation? There is some truth and some exaggeration. On one hand, the blackout undeniably exposed that certain safeguards and backup systems were insufficient. If, hypothetically, a few more big thermal plants had been online that day providing inertia and reserves, the outcome might have been different. Spain’s grid “requires investments to adapt to the technical reality of the new generation mix,” as REE’s own head of operations admitted. That is essentially agreeing that the mix as currently managed isn’t fully secure. Moreover, diversity of supply is a hallmark of resilience: relying on any single type of resource (even if it’s “the sun”) can be risky when conditions change. The evening of April 28 saw wind and solar drop to near-zero as the sun set and winds calmed, leaving Spain to rely on imports and scrambling gas units. Such swings will intensify with higher renewable shares unless mitigated.
On the other hand, pinning the blackout simply on “too many renewables” is oversimplified, if not misleading. Danish and German grids have operated at 100% wind or solar for brief periods without crashing (though with robust interconnectors and controls). Portugal, which was also almost fully renewable on April 28, initially stayed online a bit longer than Spain before being dragged down — suggesting the trigger was a specific technical event, not an inherent inability of renewables to keep lights on. As EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen remarked, “the causes of the blackout cannot be reduced to a specific source of energy, for instance renewables”. The fact that the grid had run in a similar state on other days “to perfection” (as Minister Aagesen noted) indicates renewables per se were not the deterministic cause; it was the combination of a high-renewable moment and a lack of certain stabilizers or protocols. In other words, correlation is not causation: yes, the blackout occurred during peak solar output, but that doesn’t mean solar output inherently causes blackouts. It means the system didn’t handle a contingency at that time.
Energy analysts point out that any type of plant can trip — coal, gas, nuclear, or renewable. What matters is the system’s design to withstand those trips. “Trips happen all the time across all asset types. Networks should be designed to withstand multiple loss of generators,” wrote engineer Roger Hollies in response to the blame game. The failure here was that losing 15 GW (equivalent to 10 large power stations or 75 solar farms) cascaded uncontrollably. That magnitude of loss suggests wider systemic issues beyond just “the sun went behind a cloud.” It might implicate protection settings, reserve policies, or communication delays. In fact, some experts suspect low-frequency oscillations in the Europe-wide system played a role, as unusual frequency “ringing” was detected from Latvia to Spain around that time. Such oscillations could be a freak occurrence unrelated to Spain’s mix, or possibly exacerbated by it — a complex technical puzzle under study.
What can be done to ensure Spain’s mix is secure, not suicidal? Broadly, two approaches: enhance the grid & support infrastructure, and adjust the generation mix or operations. The first is uncontroversial: massive grid upgrades are already planned, and now must be expedited. This means stronger transmission links especially in renewable-rich regions, updated protection systems (as REE wanted), and cutting-edge control software using AI to predict and manage fluctuations. Also, dramatically scaling energy storage and demand response. Spain has a target to install about 20 GW of storage by 2030 (pumped hydro and batteries combined) in its NECP. Realizing that target will go a long way to buffer the highs and lows of renewables. Grid-forming battery inverters can also provide synthetic inertia, reacting in milliseconds to prop up frequency. Already, pilot projects in the Canaries have shown that solar-plus-battery systems can keep an island grid stable in the absence of thermal plants. On the mainland, more pumped hydro projects (like the 1.5 GW Nant de Drance plant Swiss built, or Spain’s own 2000 MW Chira-Soria project in Gran Canaria) will help store midday surplus for evening use. Demand response is another underused tool: Spain could incentivize large consumers or aggregated EV chargers to quickly cut usage when frequency dips, acting as “virtual power plants” to stabilize the grid.
On the generation side, one option is to maintain a core of firm capacity until new tech fills the gap. This could mean slowing the coal and nuclear phase-outs or ensuring sufficient gas plants remain operational. Spain already closed most coal, and politically it’s unlikely to reopen that chapter (coal’s contribution is now minuscule, and its emissions make it untenable). But nuclear presents a dilemma: the plants are aging and politically unpopular in the current government, yet they provide reliable low-carbon power and inertia. The opposition pledges to extend nuclear if they win power; industry would likely support that if the economics (or subsidies) are there. However, given Spain’s strong renewable trajectory, even extended reactors would eventually shut by the 2040s. So nuclear is at best a temporary crutch. Natural gas plants might be more flexible in the near term. Spain must ensure that enough gas-fired capacity stays online, even if running rarely. This might require more capacity payments to these plants to avoid early retirements. During extreme events (like prolonged windless periods or a grid restart after blackout), having modern CCGTs available is a lifesaver. But gas has its own insecurity now (volatile global prices, and decarbonization demands). Spain plans to convert some CCGTs to burn green hydrogen or ammonia in the future, which could keep them relevant in a net-zero scenario.
One should note that reversing the renewable build-out is neither feasible nor desirable. The climate crisis and EU mandates mean Spain cannot slow-walk on clean energy – nor does it want to, given the economic benefits (renewables have brought investment and made Spain a net power exporter at times). The key is managing them better. Countries like Ireland and Great Britain, which have very high wind penetration, have instituted special grid services: they procure “synchronous compensators,” fast-responding reserves, and enforce grid code requirements that new wind farms have fault ride-through and voltage control capabilities. Spain likely will adopt similar or stricter requirements for new solar/wind plants to contribute to stability (for example, mandating that inverter-based resources provide a minimum reactive power or inertia response). ENTSO-E is exploring requiring wind/solar to have “grid-forming” capabilities by default. All this essentially means future renewables won’t be just passive power sources, but active grid-supporting resources.
Another aspect is regional balance and decentralization. Instead of huge single-source plants, diversifying renewable geography can help. Spain has done well integrating wind (which is stronger in the north and at night) and solar (strong in the south and midday) – their profiles complement each other to some extent. Seasonal complementarity too: winter brings more wind, summer more sun. The blackout hit at a moment of solar dominance and low wind. In a different season, wind might have provided more inherent inertia via big turbine rotors and distributed output. Encouraging a mix of renewables (including emerging ones like renewable thermal, wave, or biomass for dispatchable renewable power) could improve resilience. Hydroelectric power remains a cornerstone for Spain; although droughts limit it some years, hydro plants can ramp very quickly to smooth fluctuations. Ensuring hydro capacity is used optimally (and perhaps not over-committed for export during critical periods) is part of the balancing act.
To the term “suicidal mix” – it’s a dramatic label that arguably serves political narratives more than technical insight. Yes, the balance today is riskier than before, but it’s not inevitably deadly. Spain’s mix can be made robust with targeted measures. Germany went through a similar debate (“energy crisis” headlines in 2022 when wind lulled and gas was scarce), yet kept moving forward on renewables after adding LNG terminals and reserve coal units as a safety net. California faced rolling blackouts in 2020 partly due to mis-timed retirements and lack of batteries, but has since beefed up capacity and shifted peak demand via pricing — effectively addressing the issue without abandoning its clean energy goals. Spain will likely follow suit: treat the blackout as a stark warning and implement a suite of fixes. Already, the government set up a crisis commission with not just officials but input from the utilities and grid experts. The major utilities (through their association Aelec) have asked to be part of the investigation committee, signaling a cooperative approach to solutions rather than finger-pointing.
One probable outcome is that Spain may moderate the pace of decommissioning dispatchable plants until new measures are in place. For example, the timeline of nuclear closures might be re-evaluated in light of grid adequacy studies. Or Spain might invest in gas-peaker plants or long-duration flow batteries specifically for contingency reserves. The cost of avoiding blackouts is far smaller than that of blackouts themselves (billions in one day, as RBC and others tallied). This cost argument may convince even climate hawks that spending on some fossil backup or grid redundancy is a worthwhile insurance for the transition period. The Spanish government also knows that public opinion can swing if blackouts become associated with green policies; maintaining reliability is crucial for sustaining support for the energy transition.
In conclusion, while Spain’s current energy mix and grid setup proved vulnerable – validating some of the concerns behind the “suicidal mix” moniker – it is not an indictment of renewables or decarbonization per se. It is a challenge to do the transition smarter. The blackout is forcing a recalibration: renewables must be complemented by robust infrastructure, policy, and yes, some old-fashioned power plants, until new tech can fully take their place. The balance between decarbonization and stability can be achieved with foresight and investment. Europe and Spain have navigated energy transitions before (albeit not this steep) – from oil to nuclear, from dirtier grids to cleaner ones. There were dire warnings of lights going out each time, and occasionally they did, but engineering and policy solutions evolved. As an IEA review noted, “such a transformed energy landscape will come with new challenges in the form of energy security, as fluctuating renewable generation will require new forms of back-up and flexibility”. Those new forms are now urgently needed. Fortunately, the blackout has jolted authorities into recognizing the time to build the safety net. In the concluding section, we consider how Spain and the EU can move forward, learning from this incident to safeguard the future of their green energy aspirations.
Conclusion: Resilience as the New Imperative
The April 28 blackout in Spain was a dramatic rendezvous between ambition and reality. It starkly demonstrated that energy security and decarbonization are two sides of the same coin: one cannot be sacrificed for the other. Spain’s heroic build-out of renewable power propelled it to the forefront of climate leadership, but it also exposed fragilities in the foundations of the power system. In the European Union context, this event resonates far beyond Spain. It raises a flag for any nation racing toward carbon neutrality: ensure the grid can keep up with the times. The old paradigm of security — stockpiling fuel and diversifying suppliers — must be expanded to a new paradigm where voltage stability, frequency control, and cyber-physical robustness are just as critical as barrels and pipelines once were.
Moving forward, Spain and the EU are responding on multiple fronts. Investigations will pin down the technical failure points, likely leading to an overhaul of certain operational protocols (for example, re-tuning protection relays and requiring primary frequency response from inverter-based resources). We can expect expedited investments in the “plumbing” of the system: transformers, transmission lines, synchronous condensers, islanding schemes, and more. The Spanish government has already signaled it will advance its grid upgrade timeline and coordinate closely with neighboring grids. At the EU level, Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen’s promised “thorough investigation” suggests Brussels might develop new guidelines to help member states maintain adequacy as renewables soar. The blackout has essentially stress-tested the EU’s resolve on Fit for 55: the answer cannot be to slow the green transition, but rather to double down on the enabling infrastructure. This means channeling funds and regulatory support toward the less visible backbone that holds the green system together.
There will also be a rebalancing of narratives. Climate skeptics seized on the blackout to argue that net-zero policies inherently undermine reliability. They point to sensationalist headlines – like a UK paper’s “Net-zero blamed for blackout chaos” – which, while not accurate in detail, tap into genuine public anxiety. To keep citizens on board with climate action, leaders must show that renewables can coexist with a stable grid. That might involve some humility and course corrections: for instance, acknowledging that gas plants or other firm capacity will play a critical support role for a while longer (and communicating why that doesn’t derail climate goals). Spain’s Prime Minister Sánchez forcefully rejected calls for more nuclear or blaming renewables, labeling such calls ignorant or dishonest. But he and others will also need to reassure people that “this will not happen again”, by outlining concrete measures. Transparency will help — already, REE and the government are sharing unprecedented data about grid incidents (e.g. disclosing those 19-second and 5-second interval events). If the public sees a serious, technical, non-partisan effort to fix the issues, trust can be maintained. In contrast, if blackouts were to recur without visible action, the political backlash could indeed slow the transition.
In a broader sense, Spain’s experience is shaping up to be a case study for the world. Many countries aim to replicate Spain’s renewable successes, from India’s solar push to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act’s clean energy spree. Each will face the challenge of integrating intermittent sources at scale. The solutions Spain adopts — whether in grid codes, market design (perhaps introducing ancillary service markets for inertia or fast reserves), or cross-border coordination — could inform best practices globally. International energy agencies and think tanks are already poring over the Iberian blackout for lessons. The consensus emerging is that modern grids can technically handle very high renewable shares, but policy and investment must align to deploy the needed tools. It’s not a reason to back off from renewables; it’s a clarion call to update everything around them.
Geopolitically, the incident will likely reinforce Europe’s determination to build an energy union that is both green and secure. The EU’s stance toward Russian gas – essentially “never again” – means there is no turning back to a fossil-fueled comfort zone. Instead, Europe will create buffer capacities: bigger strategic gas storage, yes (for the short term), but more importantly strategic flexibility assets in electricity – akin to a backup fleet that only runs when needed, and robust grid links that allow mutual aid. Europe may also accelerate efforts in emerging tech like green hydrogen as seasonal storage and as a way to provide dispatchable power without CO₂. Spain is at the heart of that, with its future hydrogen infrastructure plan (H2Med) and vast renewables that could produce hydrogen to be stored for winter use or converted back to power in fuel cells or turbines. In effect, Europe’s energy security doctrine is evolving: from “just import gas from elsewhere” to “produce clean energy at home and share it widely, but be prepared with backup when nature lulls”. Diplomacy will support this by smoothing out conflicts like the one with Algeria, strengthening trans-Mediterranean cooperation, and forging alliances for supply chains of critical materials so that building all this new kit (batteries, transformers, etc.) isn’t hampered by new dependencies.
Perhaps the most profound change will be cultural — within the utilities and grid operators. A veteran Spanish grid engineer might have once been most worried about fuel supply or a big generator fault; now their nightmares will be about systemic instability or software glitches in a complex web of decentralized resources. The skillset and mindset needed are changing. REE’s operators famously have kept Spain’s lights on through past challenges (like abruptly cutting off Morocco when Algeria shut the gas pipeline, or managing the 2018 solar eclipse affecting solar PV output). After April 28, they will incorporate new protocols, like surgeons learning from a bad incident in the operating room. Already, ENTSO-E has convened experts to dissect the event second-by-second, and those findings will feed into training and contingency planning across Europe. The concept of N-1 security (the grid can handle losing any one element) might be extended to N-2 or more for high-impact nodes, given how quickly multiple losses cascaded. Blackstart capabilities (how to re-energize after a full collapse) will likely be bolstered, maybe by equipping more small plants or even battery stations to kickstart local islands of the grid.
In closing, the saga of Spain’s “energy security and a suicidal mix” is ultimately one of adaptation. The blackout was a shock, but it can also be seen as the birth pangs of a new energy era. An era in which climate imperatives and security imperatives converge. Spain and Europe will not commit energy suicide; they will adapt and survive. Decarbonization is not at odds with security — it simply demands that we redefine security. Just as nations learned to secure oil tankers and gas pipelines, they must now secure electron and data flows in an increasingly renewable world. Spain’s blackout might have been the dramatic wake-up call to hasten this adaptation. With the right lessons learned, Spain can transform its “suicidal mix” into a sustainable mix that is clean, affordable, and resilient against both the whims of weather and the unexpected flickers of fate. The lights in Europe’s green future must not only be powered by the sun and wind but also be unflinchingly steady, come what may.
Sources:
Reuters – “How warning signs hinted at Spain's unprecedented power outage”
Reuters – “Spain, Portugal switch back on, seek answers after biggest ever blackout”
Al Jazeera – “Spain’s grid denies renewable energy to blame for massive blackout”
The Guardian – “Spain and Portugal power outage: what caused it, and was there a cyber-attack?”
Science Media Centre – Expert reaction to power outages across Spain and Portugal
Carbon Brief – “Q&A: What we do – and do not – know about the blackout in Spain and Portugal”
ABC (Spain) – “Las energéticas alertaron ... de un ‘mix suicida’”
ANS Nuclear Newswire – “Spain, Portugal seek answers following massive power outage”
El Periódico de la Energía – “El Gobierno desoyó la petición de REE de cambiar el protocolo...”
International Energy Agency – Spain 2021 Energy Policy Review
Financial Times – “Spain and Portugal blackout a wake-up call on grid resilience”
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