The $750 Billion Energy Agreement: The Spark Igniting an Imminent Conflict
“Von der Leyen's Gamble 750 Billions Deal…
An Analysis of Permanent Crisis, Failed Diplomacy, and the Art of Strategic Self-Destruction
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https://x.com/Germantoroghio/status/1950513796927107140
Source: Energycentral.com
Av Germán Toro Ghio
Karlstad, Sweden | July 30, 2025
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#EnergyGeopolitics #ESGInvestmentFailure #ChineseEnergyDominance #ClimateCapitalism
Abstract
This essay examines the philosophical underpinnings of human behaviours that lead to war through the lens of a contemporary crisis: the $750 billion energy deal that threatens to spark immediate global conflict. By integrating psychoanalytic theory, political philosophy, existential thought and economic analysis, the study explores why humans repeatedly engage in seemingly irrational and destructive behaviours, even when the consequences appear catastrophic.
Drawing upon Freud’s psychoanalytic framework, the analysis reveals how unconscious motivations—particularly the death drive (Thanatos)—manifest in aggressive geopolitical strategies surrounding energy resources. These unconscious drives operate beneath idealistic rationalisations about energy security and national sovereignty, masking deeper, destructive instincts that push nations toward conflict over the massive energy deal. Naivety, rooted in idealistic overestimation of moral principles and underestimation of political realities, has led key decision‑makers to pursue provocative energy policies that ignore complex power dynamics.
The case of Yevgeny Prigozhin serves as a stark illustration of this naivety. As analysed by Germán & Co. (2024) in Prigozhin’s lesson for Trump & Co: Don’t trust Putin’s promises, Prigozhin’s trajectory—from a 24‑hour rebellion to 50‑day promises to his death within ten days—demonstrates the dangerous illusion of trusting authoritarian assurances. This case study reveals the profound unconsciousness that drives political figures like Trump, Ramaswamy and Macron to entertain negotiations with Vladimir Putin, despite clear evidence of his unreliability. Such idealistic approaches demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of how authoritarian regimes behave in international systems, particularly when trillion‑dollar energy resources are at stake.
Through Hobbes’s concept of the state of nature, the study illuminates humanity’s inherent competitiveness and provocative instincts, showing how the absence of strong international authority in energy governance creates conditions where nations revert to a “war of all against all.” The energy deal becomes a flashpoint that reveals these fundamental drives toward dominance and competition for scarce resources. Existential and absurdist perspectives from Sartre and Camus provide additional insight, interpreting the crisis as humanity’s tragic assertion of existence and freedom in the face of life’s inherent meaninglessness. The willingness to risk war over energy resources reflects a profound, if destructive, affirmation of national identity and purpose.
The analysis incorporates Marxist theory and realpolitik to explain how the energy deal represents both class struggle on a global scale and pragmatic power politics. The $750 billion figure illuminates how economic inequalities and national interests drive states toward conflict, with energy serving as both commodity and weapon in international relations.
By synthesising these philosophical perspectives with contemporary geopolitical analysis, this essay demonstrates that human engagement in war—even over seemingly rational economic interests like energy deals—is driven by a complex interplay of unconscious psychological forces, naive idealism, inherent competitiveness, existential assertions and pragmatic political calculations. The current energy crisis serves as a compelling case study of how these deep‑seated human tendencies manifest in modern international relations, offering insights into why humans continue to make destructive decisions despite clear awareness of their catastrophic potential.
This multifaceted analysis provides both theoretical understanding and practical insights into the philosophical forces that drive contemporary conflicts, using the energy deal crisis to illuminate the enduring patterns of human behaviour that lead civilisations toward war.
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Introduction: The Illusion of a Quick Fix
In the early months of 2025, the transatlantic relationship appeared on the cusp of a dramatic transformation. Faced with a war in Ukraine that had upended the post‑Cold War order and a sabotage attack on the Nord Stream pipelines that turned the Baltic Sea into a crime scene, leaders in Washington and Brussels proclaimed a bold plan to fix the world in twenty‑four hours. At the heart of this promise was an unprecedented energy pact: the European Union would purchase $250 billion worth of U.S. energy products each year for three years—$750 billion in total. The explicit goal was to replace Russian gas with liquefied natural gas (LNG) exported from the United States. According to American officials, the deal would turn America’s shale boom into a lifeline for Europe, ensure the lights stayed on in Berlin and Paris, and deliver instant stability. In the same breath, Washington advocated for 15% tariffs on European industrial goods, presenting the measure as a move towards fairer transatlantic trade. Publicly, the agreement was portrayed as a simple solution: sign the deal, activate the gas tankers, and Europe's energy crisis would be resolved.
The Nord Stream sabotage in September 2022 starkly weaponised energy, the foundation of industrial civilisation and prosperity. This act, creating the most significant methane leak on record, highlighted critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and plunged Europe into heightened insecurity. Russia’s pipeline empire, once a symbol of mutual dependence, became an object of suspicion; every cable and pipeline turned into a potential tripwire. European diplomats whispered about “strategic autonomy,” but the urgency of winter gas shortages forced them to defer dreams of self‑reliance to a distant future. The $750 billion pledge, though never codified in binding contracts, tied Europe to American shale and took the concept of dependency to a new extreme. To meet a proposed target, the EU would need to triple its €76 billion imports of U.S. energy products by displacing cheaper suppliers like Norway. However, analysts argue that energy companies, not governments, dictate supply purchases, rendering the plan largely symbolic.
This essay interrogates the illusion of a quick fix. It begins with the circumstances that gave birth to the deal and the immediate warning by Donald Trump to his “friend” Vladimir Putin that he had ten days to end the war in Ukraine or face unspecified consequences. It then traces how the new energy order has shifted the global balance of power, how emerging trade wars and critical mineral dependencies are reshaping geopolitics, and how sabotage and hybrid warfare have turned energy infrastructure into a battlefield. The analysis relies on a wide range of credible sources—news reports, policy analyses and academic studies—to contextualise a narrative that mixes fact and speculation. By dividing the essay into two parts, each with several chapters, the aim is to provide a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of how a huge energy deal became, or could become, the spark of a broader conflict.
The events of 2025 did not take place in isolation, and a deeper understanding requires looking back at decades of European and American energy policy. After World War II, reconstruction efforts in Europe were fuelled by cheap coal and oil imported from the United States and the Middle East. The Marshall Plan financed not only factories but also pipelines and power plants. In the 1950s and 1960s, coal remained the dominant fuel in Western Europe, while the Soviet Union supplied oil and gas to its satellite states in the East. The 1973 oil crisis marked a turning point: OPEC’s embargo caused prices to quadruple, pushing industrialised nations to diversify. Western Europe responded by developing nuclear power, improving energy efficiency and launching early renewable programs. Yet the subsequent glut of cheap oil in the 1980s and 1990s lulled policymakers into complacency. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Europe embraced the idea that trade would foster peace and tapped Russian resources with gusto. Within two decades, pipelines under the Baltic and Black Seas became arteries connecting two formerly antagonistic blocs.
Another key element of context is the evolution of American energy policy. The United States went from being a net importer of oil in the 1970s to a net exporter of energy in the 2010s thanks to technological breakthroughs in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. The shale revolution unleashed vast quantities of oil and gas from formations in Texas, North Dakota and Pennsylvania. U.S. gas production nearly doubled between 2005 and 2020, and by 2023, the country surpassed Qatar and Australia to become the world's largest LNG exporter. Policies like the Energy Policy Act of 2005, lifting the crude oil export ban in 2015, and building LNG terminals at Sabine Pass and Freeport transformed the U.S. into an energy leader. The Trump administration boosted exports further by simplifying permits and encouraging allies to purchase U.S. gas. At the same time, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 introduced incentives for renewable energy, battery storage, and electric vehicles, signalling a shift towards greener energy while fossil fuel exports surged. By 2025, the U.S. will negotiate from a position of power, offering gas to Europe, subsidising its green industries, and imposing tariffs on foreign rivals.
At the level of global narratives, the notion of a quick fix resonates with a broader cultural fascination with immediate solutions. In an era dominated by social media, political messaging is often reduced to sound bites. Leaders promise to solve complex problems—be it pandemics, climate change or wars—within days or weeks. The 2025 energy deal fits this pattern: it proposes an instant remedy to Europe’s dependency, ignoring the years of investment and infrastructure that undergird energy systems. When audiences are saturated with crises, the appeal of a decisive gesture can override scepticism. Critics liken this to magical thinking, where a signature is expected to reverse the laws of physics. The essay, therefore, strives to unpack the deeper processes at play and to counter the temptation to accept simplistic solutions.
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Part I: The Deal That Changed Everything
1. From Crisis to “Solution”
Europe’s energy crisis did not begin with the signing of an ambitious trade pact, but with the geopolitical shock of February 24 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine. As shells rained down on Kyiv and Kharkiv, the European Union confronted its dependence on Russian fossil fuels. In 2021, roughly 40 per cent of the EU’s gas consumption came from Russian pipelines; in Germany, the share was over 50 per cent. By the end of 2023 the EU had reduced Russia’s share of its gas imports to just 15 percentbruegel.org, but only by paying exorbitant prices for LNG from the United States, Qatar and even Russia itself. Norway overtook Russia as the main pipeline supplierbruegel.org, yet the shift was accompanied by a spree of investments in LNG terminals. Germany, for instance, inaugurated its first floating regasification facility in December 2022 and planned several more despite questions about their long‑term necessitycleanenergywire.org. Instead of making Europe more autonomous, the rush to import LNG created a new dependency on U.S. shale gas.
Against this backdrop, U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025 after a tumultuous election. During his campaign, he repeatedly promised to end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours.” Once in office, he sought to combine energy policy with his foreign agenda. According to Reuters, Trump and EU leaders negotiated a pledge for the EU to buy $250 billion a year of U.S. energy products for three years in exchange for exemptions from the U.S. import tariffs that his administration was imposing. The White House described this $750 billion energy deal as a measure to guarantee Europe’s energy security, reduce Russia’s leverage and address the transatlantic trade imbalance. The same week, Trump gave Putin an ultimatum: he had ten days to stop the war or face punitive measures. washingtonpost.com The ultimatum originally encompassed sanctions and tariffs rather than bombing, but the rhetorical threat to start bombing, which later echoed in political discourse, captured the imagination of analysts and fueled speculation about an impending escalation.
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2. An Unworkable Pledge
On paper, the deal looked straightforward: European governments would commit to buying U.S. oil, gas and nuclear fuel, while Washington would reduce its tariffs on European industrial goods. In reality, the plan faced numerous obstacles. First, the EU does not purchase energy directly; energy companies—many privately owned—decide whom to buy from based on price and supply security. The EU can set tariffs and regulations, but it cannot force companies to sign contracts with U.S. exporters. Second, the volumes required to meet the $750 billion target were not available. The EU imported around €375 billion of energy in 2024, with only about €76 billion coming from the U.S. Tripling U.S. imports would require diverting flows from Norway and other suppliers or paying a premium to capture cargoes destined for Asia. Analysts cited by Reuters pointed out that the pledge would require redirecting most U.S. LNG exports to Europe and would still fall short. The EU would have to import nearly all U.S. oil exports to reach the target—a logistical impossibility, Reuters.com.
Third, the time frame made the pledge suspect. A 2022–24 surge in U.S. LNG export capacity was underway, with new terminals under construction. Still, even with these expansions, global export capacity was expected to rise from 578 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2023 to about 850 bcm by 2030. Europe would need to lock in long‑term contracts for decades to justify building additional regasification facilities. Germany’s new terminals were designed to operate for 20–30 years, contradicting the EU’s climate goals and the expectation that gas demand will decline by up to 74 per cent by 2050 in ambitious climate scenarios. In short, the $750 billion promise was a political gesture more than a realistic energy plan. It signalled U.S. willingness to flood Europe with LNG, but also sought to reassert American dominance in the face of China’s manufacturing surge and Russia’s pipeline games.
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3. The Ten‑Day Ultimatum and Its Consequences
Trump’s ultimatum to Putin was part performance, part pressure tactic. According to the Washington Post (citing the Associated Press), Trump gave his Russian counterpart 10–12 days to stop the war and reach a peace deal; otherwise, he would impose additional sanctions and tariffs. There was no immediate threat of bombing, yet the media’s focus on the phrase “we start bombing” reflects how rhetorical signals can inflame fears. In a climate where pipelines were exploding and drones were striking tankers in the Red Sea, an ultimatum from a U.S. president carried weight far beyond the specifics of trade policy. It underscored the idea that the energy deal and the war were interconnected: if Moscow did not comply, Washington might not only cut off Russia from markets but also take more aggressive action.
The reaction in Moscow and Brussels was complex. Russian officials dismissed the ultimatum as bluster and insisted that Russia would not abandon its objectives in Ukraine. European leaders publicly supported the push for peace but privately worried that the escalation of sanctions could further disrupt energy markets. In financial markets, U.S. LNG companies rallied on news of the potential trade windfall. Shares of producers like Cheniere Energy rose as investors bet on a sustained boom. At the same time, European industrial stocks fell, reflecting fears of higher energy costs and U.S. tariffs on European exports. The immediate consequence was a sharpening of geopolitical fault lines: Europe more firmly aligned with the United States against Russia. At the same time, Russia turned to Asia to sell its oil at a discount, circumventing Western sanctions via a shadow fleet of ageing tankers.
4. Strategic Implications
Although the energy pledge did not materialise as initially proposed, its strategic implications were significant. By publicly committing to buy vast quantities of U.S. energy, Europe signalled that it viewed American shale as a cornerstone of its future. This gave Washington leverage in other disputes, from EV tariffs to NATO burden sharing. At the same time, the pledge deepened transatlantic tensions by linking energy to trade. The United States insisted that lowering its import tariffs would require the EU to accept more American gas, oil and refined products. In effect, Washington sought to impose an energy quid pro quo: you buy our gas, we ease our tariffs. This coupling blurred the boundaries between energy security and trade negotiations, making it harder for Europe to pursue independent policies.
For Russia, the prospective EU–U.S. deal was a wake‑up call. Moscow realised that its long‑term strategy of leveraging pipelines to control European politics was faltering. In response, Russia intensified its hybrid warfare against undersea infrastructure. It gathered a fleet of roughly 400 old tankers with opaque ownership structures and minimal insurance that could evade sanctions and, according to Western security agencies, drag anchors across undersea cables and pipelines in shallow waters. Finnish investigators suspect that one such vessel, the Eagle S, cut the Estlink 2 electricity cable connecting Finland and Estonia in December 2024. In total, at least ten pipelines and cables have been sabotaged in the Baltic Sea since Russia invaded Ukraine. By turning merchant ships into instruments of sabotage, Russia weaponised interdependence and blurred the line between trade and war.
China watched these developments with interest. As Europe and the United States sparred over tariffs and energy, Beijing accelerated its Belt and Road investments in critical minerals, rare‑earth processing and EV manufacturing. Analysts have argued that China dominates 68 per cent of the world’s nickel refining, 40 per cent of copper, 59 per cent of lithium and 73 per cent of cobalt processing. It controls roughly 70 per cent of cathode production and 85 per cent of anode production for EV batteries, crossdockinsights.com. In the context of the energy pact, Chinese officials interpreted the EU–U.S. arrangement as an attempt to sideline Chinese producers and restrict access to Western markets. Beijing responded by threatening to limit exports of critical minerals such as gallium, germanium and antimony. Thus, a deal meant to reduce Russian influence inadvertently spurred a three-way contest between the United States, Europe, and China over energy, trade, and technology.
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5. Domestic Politics and Public Perception
Within both the United States and the European Union, domestic politics complicated the deal. American environmentalists decried the expansion of LNG exports, pointing to a 33 per cent higher greenhouse‑gas footprint for LNG compared to coal. They warned that investing billions in gas infrastructure would lock in emissions for decades and jeopardise climate goals. Republicans framed the deal as a triumph of American energy dominance, while Democrats worried that it would alienate climate‑conscious voters. In Europe, the left criticised the plan as a capitulation to U.S. corporate interests, while conservative governments in Poland and Hungary accused Brussels of undermining national sovereignty.
Public perception also shifted. In Germany, protests against LNG terminals erupted as activists highlighted the environmental risks of methane leaks (cleanenergywire.org. The promise of cheaper energy from U.S. shale did not assuage concerns that Germany was trading one form of dependency for another. In France and Italy, inflationary pressures due to high gas prices fuelled resentment toward both Russia and the United States. The narrative of a “quick fix” was replaced by a recognition that energy security is messy, expensive and deeply political. The illusion that stability could be signed into existence dissolved as sabotage, cyber‑attacks and trade disputes escalated.
Domestic debates were further complicated by the diversity of interests within Europe. Germany, with its large industrial base, feared that losing access to cheap pipeline gas would erode its competitiveness in chemicals, steel and automotive manufacturing. Poland and the Baltic states, historically wary of Russian influence, embraced the idea of cutting off Moscow and welcomed U.S. LNG as a geopolitical insurance policy. France, which relies heavily on nuclear power, saw the crisis as an opportunity to promote nuclear energy as a low‑carbon alternative; it pressed for EU funding for new reactors and argued that nuclear should be classified as “green” in the EU taxonomy. Southern European countries like Spain and Portugal were less dependent on Russian gas. They lobbied for more interconnectors across the Pyrenees to export their surplus LNG and renewable electricity to the rest of the continent. These differing priorities made it difficult for the European Commission to craft a unified response. When Brussels negotiated the $750 billion energy pledge, it had to balance the demands of German industry, Polish security concerns, French nuclear lobbying and the environmental movement.
In the United States, the energy pact became entangled with the culture wars. Conservative commentators celebrated the return of American “energy dominance,” citing the deal as proof that the world needed U.S. fossil fuels. They argued that by selling gas to Europe, America could weaken adversaries and create jobs at home. Progressive voices countered that doubling down on fossil fuel exports undermined the Biden administration’s climate commitments and would expose frontline communities in Texas and Louisiana to increased pollution. They demanded that stronger environmental protections and investments in renewables accompany any increase in exports. Labour unions were split: some supported LNG infrastructure for its construction jobs; others feared that overreliance on gas would slow the growth of domestic clean‑energy industries. Meanwhile, state governments in Louisiana and Texas pushed for more export terminals, while coastal communities protested new pipelines crossing wetlands and fisheries.
Public opinion polls in early 2025 showed a complex picture. In Europe, a majority supported reducing dependence on Russia but were divided on whether to increase imports from the United States or accelerate renewables. In the U.S., a majority favoured supporting Ukraine and selling gas to allies but were wary of a trade war that could raise the price of consumer goods. The interplay of these domestic factors meant that the $750 billion energy deal was never solely about economics; it was a mirror reflecting the political and cultural divisions within and between societies. Understanding these divisions is essential to grasping why the deal, though headline‑grabbing, did not proceed as advertised.
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Part II: The New Energy Order
1. LNG Ascendant: Europe’s Gas Transformation
A global realignment in gas flows marks the new energy order. The Nord Stream explosion forced Europe to look beyond pipelines for security. Within a year, the EU imported 8.4 million tonnes of LNG in the first quarter of 2025, surpassing the 8.2 million tonnes of pipeline gas for the first time. LNG imports rose 12 per cent compared with the same period in 2024, and spending on LNG increased 45 per cent to €5.3 billion. The United States became the EU’s largest LNG supplier, accounting for 50.7 per cent by value, while Russia still supplied 17 per cent and Qatar 10.8 per cent. Simultaneously, Norway remained the largest pipeline supplier, meaning that Europe’s gas mix diversified but remained vulnerable to seaborne disruptions.bruegel.org.
The shift to LNG did not eliminate environmental concerns. Studies from Cornell University found that the greenhouse-gas footprint of LNG is 33 per cent higher than that of coal. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that LNG produces 67 per cent more emissions than pipeline gas. Methane leakage during liquefaction, transport and regasification undermines the perceived climate benefits of gas as a “bridge fuel.” Critics thus argue that building billions of dollars of LNG infrastructure may lock Europe into a high‑emissions path and delay the adoption of renewables.
Nevertheless, geopolitical realities trumped climate considerations. Germany’s government defended its decision to build multiple LNG terminals by citing the need for a safety buffer, cleanenergywire.org. Policymakers emphasised that floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs) can be repurposed or relocated once gas demand declines. Yet environmental NGOs pointed out that the combined capacity of planned terminals far exceeds projected demand, suggesting that Germany might be overspending for infrastructure that could become stranded assets as renewable energy expands. The German case illustrates the tension between energy security and climate policy: in the short term, gas ensures heat and industrial output; in the long term, it may hinder decarbonisation.
2. The Weaponisation of Trade: Tariffs, Subsidies and EV Battles
While Europe turned to American gas, trade relations between the U.S. and its allies deteriorated. In May 2025, the U.S. administration finalised high tariffs on imports of solar cells and modules from Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia. Reuters.com. China had relocated production to these countries to evade earlier tariffs; the U.S. move aimed to prevent circumvention but raised costs for American solar installers. A few months earlier, in September 2024, the U.S. announced 100 per cent tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, 50 per cent on solar cells and semiconductors, and 25 per cent on batteries, steel, aluminium and critical minerals. reuters.com. These measures, combined with earlier Trump‑era duties on $300 billion of Chinese goods, signalled a full‑blown trade war. Industry groups warned that the tariffs would disrupt supply chains and raise costs, Reuters.com. Chinese manufacturers responded by shifting production to Indonesia and Laos, Reuters.com.
The European Union followed suit. In October 2024, the EU imposed provisional duties ranging from 17 per cent to 35.3 per cent on Chinese EVs. Brussels accused Beijing of subsidising its EV industry and flooding Europe with cheap cars. Chinese exports to the EU had surged from 33 thousand vehicles in 2020 to 485 thousand between October 2022 and September 2023. The tariff decision triggered immediate backlash. Beijing threatened to impose tariffs on European cars and to restrict exports of critical minerals necessary for EV batteries. The EU and China later opened negotiations to replace tariffs with minimum prices, reflecting a desire to avoid an escalating trade war. Nevertheless, the battle over EVs revealed the fragility of the green transition: subsidies and tariffs intended to promote clean technologies were instead spurring protectionism and retaliation.
Tariffs on critical minerals further complicated the picture. The United States and the European Union both identified minerals such as lithium, cobalt and nickel as strategic assets. In the Crossdock Insights report, analysts noted that China refines 68 per cent of the world’s nickel, 40 per cent of copper, 59 per cent of lithium and 73 per cent of cobalt (crossdockinsights.com. It also accounts for 70 per cent of cathode and 85 per cent of anode production, giving it a dominant position in the battery supply chain, crossdockinsights.com. When Washington raised tariffs on critical mineral imports, Beijing responded by restricting exports of antimony, gallium, germanium, and tungsten. The EU and the U.S. both passed legislation to boost domestic extraction and processing: the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act aims to mine 10 per cent, refine 40 per cent and recycle 25 per cent of strategic minerals within the bloc by 2030, while the U.S. invoked the Defence Production Act to fund mining projects. Far from smoothing the green transition, these measures highlighted a resource scramble reminiscent of 19th‑century imperialism.
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3. Critical Minerals and the New Scramble for Africa
The competition for critical minerals has fostered new geopolitical alliances and conflicts. Africa and Latin America, home to vast deposits of lithium, cobalt and rare earths, have become arenas of economic diplomacy. China’s state‑owned enterprises have secured long‑term leases on mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia and Zimbabwe. Western governments, alarmed by this dominance, have sought to counterbalance Beijing by financing alternative mining projects and forging Minerals Security Partnerships. For example, the U.S. has invested in lithium extraction in Chile and cobalt processing in Tanzania. The EU has provided aid to Namibia and Morocco in exchange for access to critical minerals.
This scramble is not only economic but also environmental and social. Mining of cobalt and lithium often involves child labour and environmental degradation. When Western firms demand ethical sourcing while Chinese companies continue operations under laxer standards, a competitive tension arises: should governments prioritise supply security or labour rights? The conversation about “lithium wars” echoes earlier conflicts over oil, and though no major military confrontation has erupted, the risk of resource‑driven instability looms large. Coupled with the rise of tariffs and subsidies, the scramble for minerals underscores how the green transition has become as geopolitically charged as the fossil‑fuel era.
4. Environmental Implications and the Green Paradox
The green paradox refers to the phenomenon where policies intended to accelerate the transition to clean energy inadvertently increase emissions in the short term. The rush to build LNG infrastructure is a textbook example. LNG has a higher carbon footprint than coal or pipeline gas due to energy‑intensive liquefaction and leakage. Yet governments justify LNG expansion as a necessary “bridge.” Similarly, the production of EV batteries requires energy‑intensive mining and processing; if the electricity comes from coal, the overall emissions may be high. When the United States or the EU imposes tariffs on solar panels and EVs, it can slow the adoption of clean technologies and raise costs for consumers. Additionally, the fragmentation of supply chains means that manufacturing may shift to countries with weaker environmental regulations, undermining global climate efforts.
A comprehensive climate strategy must address these paradoxes by integrating energy security, industrial policy and emissions reduction. That includes investing in green hydrogen, grid upgrades and storage rather than simply replacing pipeline gas with LNG. It also means diversifying supply chains for critical minerals and establishing ethical standards for extraction. Without such measures, the new energy order may replicate the extractive and exploitative dynamics of the oil age, with new winners and losers but the same underlying logic of domination.
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Part III: Global Power Positions
1. Russia: Sabotage, Shadow Fleets and Energy Warfare
Russia’s power in the global energy system has historically rested on its vast reserves of oil and gas and its network of pipelines connecting Siberia to European markets. The collapse of this model after 2022 forced Moscow to innovate in the domain of energy warfare. When the EU drastically reduced imports of Russian gas from about half of its supply to 15 per cent, bruegel.org, Russia pivoted to Asia and started selling at a discount. To circumvent the G7’s price cap on Russian oil exports, Moscow assembled a shadow fleet of around 400 ageing tankers. These vessels, often registered in countries like the Seychelles or the Marshall Islands and lacking proper insurance, have transported Russian, Iranian and Venezuelan oil beyond the reach of Western sanctions. Experts note that fewer than 10 per cent of these ships have proper insurance, but they make up 17 per cent of the global oil tanker fleet. Their operations are not entirely clandestine; they openly load oil at Russian ports like Primorsk and Ust Luga, but they often turn off transponders and ignore coast‑guard instructions.
The shadow fleet’s most troubling role lies in its potential for sabotage. Investigations in 2024–25 linked Russian‑associated tankers to the severing of multiple undersea cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea. In December 2024, a Russian tanker named Eagle S was impounded in Finland after an EstLink2 cable connecting Finland and Estonia was cut. The ship’s missing anchor was found near the damaged cable, and the vessel was also fitted with surveillance equipment, unusual for a merchant shipfriendsofeurope.org. Earlier, several other cables and the Balticconnector gas pipeline had been damaged by ships dragging anchors. Western officials suspect a deliberate campaign of hybrid warfare designed to increase uncertainty and raise insurance costs for shipping. Although definitive proof of state involvement is elusive, the pattern of incidents—ten pipelines and cables sabotaged since the invasion of Ukraine (friendsofeurope.org )—points to a strategy of weaponised interdependence.
Russia’s cyber operations complement its physical sabotage. While this essay focuses primarily on energy infrastructure, it is essential to note that cyberattacks can disrupt energy markets and funding flows. Russia, along with other states, employs sophisticated malware to target electricity grids, oil refineries and port operations. The synergy between physical sabotage (e.g., dragging anchors) and cyberattacks creates a multi‑domain threat: sabotage at sea can be combined with malware attacks on pipeline control systems, amplifying the impact. The Nord Stream explosions were preceded by Russia’s use of cyber operations against Ukraine’s grid since 2015, demonstrating Moscow’s integrated approach to energy warfare.
2. China: Minerals, Manufacturing and Maritime Choke Points
China’s grand strategy in the 21st century revolves around securing supply chains for energy and technology. While Russia relies on pipelines, China focuses on critical minerals and manufacturing capacity. As previously mentioned, Beijing refines the majority of the world’s nickel, cobalt, lithium and copper and dominates battery production. This gives China leverage over the clean energy transition. In 2010, Beijing temporarily cut rare‑earth exports to Japan, demonstrating its willingness to weaponise mineral supply chains. In 2024–25 China restricted exports of antimony, gallium, germanium, tungsten and bismuth in retaliation for U.S. tariffscrossdockinsights.com. Price spikes following these restrictions underscored the vulnerability of Western industries to Chinese supply decisions.
China is also expanding its influence through infrastructure networks. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) funds ports, railways and pipelines across Asia, Africa and Europe. In the energy realm, Beijing has invested heavily in ports at Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Piraeus (Greece), creating a string of logistical hubs that can facilitate both trade and naval operations. Chinese companies are building LNG terminals and regasification facilities in Pakistan and Bangladesh, expanding the market for Qatari and U.S. gas but also cementing Chinese control over supply chains. In the South China Sea, Beijing has constructed artificial islands and deployed coast‑guard vessels to assert control over waters that may contain untapped gas reserves. The Taiwan Strait remains a critical choke point; an effective blockade could disrupt global semiconductor and electronics supply chains and hinder the transit of LNG from the United States to Asia.
China’s military strategy includes anti‑access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to make intervention by the U.S. Navy costly. Long-range anti-ship missiles, submarines, and anti-satellite weapons could threaten commercial shipping. Moreover, Beijing has studied the concept of weaponised interdependence: states can coerce others by exploiting their control over global networks. The network may be financial (as when Washington uses SWIFT to sanction banks) or physical (as when Beijing controls rare‑earth supplies). The interplay between infrastructure control and economic leverage is at the heart of China’s rise.
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3. Iran: The Straits of Hormuz and the Spectre of Blockade
Iran holds a unique position in global energy geopolitics because it sits astride the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important oil chokepoint. The Strait is only about 34 km wide at its narrowest point, with shipping lanes just 2 km wide in each direction, yet roughly 20 per cent of global petroleum liquids and about one‑fifth of LNG trade pass through the Strait. In 2024, flows through the Strait of Hormuz averaged 20 million barrels per day, equivalent to about 20 per cent of global consumption. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE have pipelines that can bypass Hormuz, they can reroute only about 2.6 million barrels per day. Hence, any blockade of the Strait would cause an immediate shock to oil and gas markets.
In July 2025, Reuters reported that U.S. intelligence had detected Iranian preparations to deploy naval mines in the Persian Gulf. The Iranian military had loaded mines onto vessels as tensions with Israel escalated after U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Reuters.com. Although Iran has threatened to close the Strait for decades, it has never done so; the mere possibility of closure is used as a deterrent. U.S. officials described the mine deployment as a potential ruse, but acknowledged that mining could have severely hobbled global commerce. Iran has more than 5,000 naval mines and could deploy them quickly, according to Reuters.com. The U.S. Navy maintains mine‑countermeasure vessels in Bahrain, but during the 2025 escalation, these ships were temporarily removed from the region, leaving the Strait more vulnerable. reuters.com. The incident highlights how a regional conflict in the Middle East can threaten global energy flows.
Iran’s energy strategy also involves proxy forces and allies. Tehran supports Yemen’s Houthis, who in 2023–25 targeted tankers in the Red Sea using drones. Iran has built relationships with militias in Iraq and Syria to threaten pipelines and logistics. Meanwhile, its oil production has remained high despite U.S. sanctions, thanks to clandestine sales to China. In July 2025, the EU’s restrictions on Russia encouraged Moscow and Tehran to deepen their partnership, with Russia investing in Iranian oil fields and pipelines to bypass sanctions. Thus, Iran occupies a dual role: both as a potential blockade power and as a partner of convenience for sanctioned states.
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4. North Korea: Cyber Larceny and Nuclear Funding
North Korea may be an economic minnow in physical energy markets, but it wields outsized influence through cyber operations. UN sanctions monitors reported in February 2024 that North Korea had carried out 58 cyberattacks on cryptocurrency companies since 2017, stealing about $3 billion. These funds, according to the monitors, may have financed up to half of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program or online.org. The cyber thefts targeted defense companies and their supply chains, showcasing the regime’s ability to weaponise digital interdependence. North Korea’s cyber workforce was estimated at 8,400 personnel in 2024, up from 6,800 in 2022. The country’s hacking groups, such as Lazarus, have attacked banks, cryptocurrency exchanges and energy companies across Asia and North America. In effect, Pyongyang converts stolen digital assets into real resources for its missile and nuclear programs.
The implications for the energy order are twofold. First, North Korea demonstrates that cyberattacks can substitute for physical resource extraction. By hacking cryptocurrency exchanges, it finances weapons without exporting oil or gas. Second, the targeting of energy companies—including power grid operators and oil producers—suggests that cyber war is a complement to kinetic warfare. A future crisis in East Asia could involve simultaneous cyber assaults on LNG terminals, pipelines and shipping firms, disrupting energy flows while missiles fly. North Korea’s alliances with Russia and Iran, and its connections with Chinese technology firms, hint at a broader coalition of states using cyber tools to challenge the U.S.‑led order.
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5. Turkey: Aspirations and Limitations as an Energy Hub
Turkey, straddling Europe and Asia, has long harboured ambitions to become a gas hub that transits energy from the Caspian and Middle East to Europe. Its geography is ideal: pipelines from Azerbaijan and Iran converge in eastern Turkey, and the Bosphorus connects the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. However, a July 2025 report on Turkey’s gas strategy notes that domestic production covers only 4 per cent of Turkish gas demand; the country imported 52 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in 2024. Russia supplied 42 per cent, Azerbaijan 22 per cent, and Iran 14 per cent of these imports. Turkey’s storage capacity is under five bcm, far below that of major hubs like the Netherlands (which has over 12 bcm). Export capacity to EU markets is limited; existing pipelines are already utilised at high rates. Each of Turkey’s suppliers faces constraints: Russia’s gas may be phased out by the EU by 2027, Azerbaijan’s production is plateauing, and Iran faces sanctions and seasonal domestic shortages. Potential new suppliers such as Iraq, Turkmenistan, Egypt and Israel also deal with political turmoil and infrastructure gaps.
As a result, analysts conclude that Turkey’s hub project is more political narrative than commercial reality. To achieve hub status, Ankara would need to invest heavily in LNG import capacity, expand storage facilities and develop reverse‑flow pipelines. It would also have to navigate complex geopolitics: balancing relations with Russia (to import gas), Azerbaijan (to transit gas), Iran (to secure supplies), the EU (to deliver gas) and the United States (to avoid secondary sanctions). Turkey’s relations with the U.S. and NATO are complicated by its purchase of Russian S‑400 air defence systems and its role in the Black Sea. The “dancing on the fault line” metaphor captures how Turkey seeks to court multiple partners without committing to any, turning energy into a tool of statecraft.
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6. United States: Shale Hegemony and Tariff Diplomacy
The United States has become the world’s largest LNG exporter, surpassing Qatar and Australia. From 2015 to 2023, the U.S. doubled its natural gas output due to the shale boom. In 2023, the U.S. supplied roughly 45 per cent of Europe’s LNG imports. The rapid expansion of LNG terminals along the Gulf Coast, combined with rising global demand, has turned American gas into a geopolitical instrument. The $750 billion deal thus fits into a broader strategy to use energy exports to reinforce alliances and punish adversaries.
However, U.S. leadership in energy is not unchallenged. The International Energy Outlook 2025 warns that global LNG export capacity may reach 850 bcm by 2030, exceeding demand under ambitious climate scenarios. This raises the risk that new LNG facilities could become stranded assets. At the same time, U.S. industrial policy has taken a confrontational turn. Tariffs on Chinese EVs, solar panels and critical minerals reflect a strategy of tariff diplomacy: by imposing high duties, Washington hopes to protect the domestic industry and gain leverage in negotiations. The risk is that such measures could provoke retaliation and hamper the global energy transition. If the U.S. is seen as using energy to coerce allies (e.g., by conditioning tariff relief on LNG purchases), transatlantic cohesion could weaken.
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7. The European Union: Between Dependency and Diversification
The European Union sits at the nexus of these power dynamics. It is the largest customer for both Russian pipeline gas (historically) and U.S. LNG (today). The EU’s long‑term strategy aims to phase out Russian gas by 2027, increase renewables, and create a hydrogen economy. But in the medium term, it must balance price stability with supply security. After the Nord Stream explosions, EU policymakers realised that most gas now arrives by sea; approximately 87 per cent of European gas imports in 2023 came via LNGbruegel.org. This shift exposes Europe to maritime chokepoints like the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz, as well as undersea sabotage. The EU has taken steps to improve monitoring: NATO established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, and member states have increased naval patrols. theguardian.com. Yet experts warn that deep-sea cables are hard to defend; they carry 90 per cent of global internet traffic and trade $9 trillion of financial transactions daily. A coordinated attack could cause catastrophic disruption, but such sabotage requires specialised equipment and is thus more likely to be used as a threat than as an overt act.
The EU is also grappling with industrial policy. While it imposes tariffs on Chinese EVs and invests in battery plants, it must avoid alienating China—a significant export market—and ensure that supply chain diversification does not lead to higher costs for consumers. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act seeks to reduce dependence on imports and build domestic capacity. But success depends on environmental permits, community acceptance and international partnerships. The EU’s energy strategy thus involves a delicate balancing act: diversify suppliers, build resilience, and maintain open markets while avoiding retaliation from major powers.
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8. Weaponised Interdependence: A Conceptual Lens
Throughout this section, a recurring theme is weaponised interdependence—a concept coined by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman to describe how states use global networks of trade, finance and information to coerce others. Energy is a classic domain of interdependence: pipelines, LNG terminals, undersea cables and shipping lanes create mutual dependencies. When Russia drags anchors over wires, or when Iran threatens to mine the Strait of Hormuz, they are leveraging interdependence to gain strategic advantage. When China restricts exports of critical minerals, it is weaponising its dominance in supply chains. When the U.S. conditions tariff relief on LNG purchases, it is using trade to enforce compliance.
The key insight is that networks are both sources of wealth and tools of coercion. States that control nodes in these networks can threaten to disrupt flows, causing economic pain. At the same time, interdependence can deter conflict by raising the costs of war. The challenge for policymakers is to manage these networks in a way that preserves resilience while reducing vulnerability. This may involve diversifying suppliers, building redundancy, and developing norms against sabotage. In the absence of such measures, interdependence becomes a latent battlefield—a silent war fought below the waterline, in the code of software and the murk of global finance.
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Part IV: Scenarios for 2025–2030
Predicting the future is fraught with uncertainty, but scenario analysis can help illuminate possible trajectories. This section outlines three broad scenarios for the period 2025–2030: Managed Rivalry, The Great Fracture, and Grey Zone Instability. Each scenario draws on current trends and known risks; none is predetermined. The probabilities assigned (25 per cent, 20 per cent and 55 per cent) are illustrative and reflect the author’s judgment rather than scientific forecasts.
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1. Managing Rivalry (Probability: 25 %)
In the Managed Rivalry scenario, global actors avoid outright war despite hardened blocs. The U.S. and China should continue their technological and trade competition, but set up guardrails to prevent escalation. Europe will gradually reduce its reliance on Russian gas by 2027, while expanding renewables and hydrogen. LNG markets stabilise; Qatar and the U.S. maintain high exports; and new LNG projects in Canada and Mozambique come online, increasing supply. Prices remain relatively stable, though above pre‑2022 levels. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act and the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act spur domestic mining, reducing reliance on Chinese minerals. Tariff wars calm as the EU and China agree on minimum prices for EVs, Reuters.com, and the U.S. moderates its tariffs after negotiating climate provisions with Beijing. Iran refrains from closing the Strait of Hormuz; occasional skirmishes occur, but the U.S. Navy and regional allies deter a blockade. Russia continues selling oil via the shadow fleet but avoids large‑scale sabotage, fearing retaliation.
Under this scenario, energy security improves, though not uniformly. Countries invest in grid resilience and monitor undersea cables. NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell expands its capabilities, and states share intelligence on shadow fleet movements. The risk of catastrophic sabotage diminishes as detection improves and as Russia realises that further attacks could provoke NATO retaliation. Meanwhile, cooperation on climate change resumes; global emissions peak by 2025 and begin to decline. The price of oil stabilises around $80–$90 per barrel, and natural gas contracts are signed on a long‑term basis. Although competition persists, the world avoids major disruptions. This scenario is plausible if leaders prioritise risk management and if domestic politics do not force extreme actions.
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2. The Great Fracture (Probability: 20 %)
The Great Fracture scenario imagines a cascading crisis. It begins with a drone attack on a central LNG terminal in Qatar, perhaps orchestrated by a proxy group. Fire engulfs storage tanks; exports drop by several million tonnes for months. Global gas prices spike above $30 per million British thermal units. Meanwhile, tensions in the Middle East ignite: in retaliation for U.S. strikes on nuclear facilities, Iran mines the Strait of Hormuz and fires missiles at tankers. Oil prices surge to $200 per barrel; Western economies tip into recession. Saudi Arabia and the UAE use their pipelines that bypass Hormuz, but the capacity is insufficient to meet global demand. China and India, dependent on Hormuz for 69 per cent of their crude imports, suffer severe energy shortages. In East Asia, a separate crisis erupts when China imposes a quarantine on Taiwan to prevent arms shipments. U.S. and allied navies escort cargo ships through the Taiwan Strait, raising the risk of confrontation. A cyberattack attributed to North Korea turns off an LNG terminal in South Korea, causing a domestic blackout. Russia sees an opportunity and severs several more undersea cables in the Baltic and North Seas, disrupting internet service and electricity for millions.
In this scenario, globalisation fractures. Countries scramble to secure supplies; export restrictions proliferate; energy markets become segmented. The International Energy Agency coordinates emergency stock releases, but prices remain volatile. Inflation soars; governments impose price controls and rationing. Political instability rises: protests sweep through Europe over high energy bills; authoritarian leaders use emergencies to consolidate power—the U.S. and China erect digital firewalls, splitting the internet. Without a functioning global order, climate cooperation collapses. Emissions rise as coal use surges to replace disrupted gas supplies. The Great Fracture is a worst‑case scenario but illustrates how interconnected vulnerabilities—physical chokepoints, cyber networks, and trade ties—can cascade into a systemic crisis. The probability may be lower than in the other scenarios, but policymakers must prepare contingency plans.
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3. Grey Zone Instability (Probability: 55 %)
The most likely trajectory, according to this analysis, is Grey Zone Instability—a world of permanent fever that neither descends into world war nor achieves stable rivalry. In this scenario, sabotage, sanctions, cyberattacks, and tariff wars become routine. Russia continues to wage hybrid warfare against Europe, dragging anchors over cables and pipelines. friendsofeurope.org. Finland, Estonia and Sweden invest in cable protection, but accidents and deliberate damage persist. The shadow fleet is expected to expand, with more than 500 vessels by 2027. Western navies impound some ships, but new ones appear under different flags. Russia, Iran and North Korea coordinate cyber campaigns; power grids in Europe and Asia face periodic outages. North Korea’s hacking groups steal billions from cryptocurrency exchanges, reuters.com, funding further nuclear tests. Iran orchestrates sporadic harassment of tankers, keeping the price of oil above $100 per barrel without fully closing Hormuz.
Trade wars intensify in the grey zone scenario. The U.S. imposes additional tariffs on Chinese computer chips and green technologies; China retaliates with export restrictions on rare earths. The EU struggles to maintain unity; some member states—Hungary, Slovakia, Italy—seek deals with Russia to secure cheaper energy. Turkey leverages its geostrategic position to act as a conduit for Russian gas, exploiting loopholes in sanctions instituted by the United States. Meanwhile, the energy transition slows. Investments in renewables continue, but supply chain disruptions and higher input costs delay projects—methane emissions from LNG increase as exporters cut corners to reduce costs. Climate policy becomes politicised with some governments prioritising energy security at the expense of emissions targets. The grey zone becomes the new normal: high tension, frequent incidents, but no decisive break.
Under this scenario, resilience becomes a buzzword. Companies diversify suppliers; governments stockpile critical minerals; ports and pipelines are hardened. Insurance premiums for shipping and undersea cables rise dramatically. The private sector invests in satellite surveillance to monitor the shadow fleet and undersea infrastructure. Public-private partnerships emerge to share intelligence, following recommendations from policy experts for public-private monitoring (kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu). Still, the constant stress exacts a toll: economic growth slows, investment falters, and trust between states erodes. Grey Zone Instability is not as catastrophic as the Great Fracture. Still, it is a world of constant low-grade warfare, making long-term planning difficult and undermining the confidence necessary for large-scale climate action.
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Part V: The Coming Decade – A Pre‑War Energy Order?
1. Historical Analogies: 1913 and 2025
Historians often compare today’s geopolitical landscape to Europe in 1913: a world of increasing trade and interdependence teetering on the brink of war. In 1913, telegraph cables and steamships connected continents. Leaders believed that economic integration would make war irrational. A year later, a single assassination triggered a chain reaction. Today, data cables and LNG tankers are the arteries of globalisation. The assumption persists that rational actors will avoid cutting these lifelines because the costs are too high. Yet history warns that miscalculations can happen. Europe’s pre‑World War I trading partners still went to war because alliances and nationalism overrode commercial logic.
In the 2020s, the parallels are striking. States are deeply connected through energy flows and supply chains, but also distrustful and increasingly nationalist. Undersea cables carry more than 90 per cent of the world’s internet traffic (theguardian.com) and facilitate about $9 trillion in trade per day (rand.org. The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines and subsequent damage to Baltic cables revealed that these networks are far more vulnerable than previously acknowledged. theguardian.com. The RAND Corporation notes that while attacking deep-sea cables is difficult and requires specialised equipment, such attacks could have catastrophic consequences, necessitating greater investment in surveillance and resilience. Similarly, the Kleinman Centre argues that transatlantic policymakers must treat sabotage threats as seriously as supply security, recommending that NATO invoke Article 4 and build public‑private partnerships to monitor infrastructure.
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2. Chokepoints and Tripwires
Geographers speak of maritime chokepoints—narrow passages whose disruption can trigger global crises. The Strait of Hormuz is one such chokepoint. When Iran loaded mines onto vessels in the Persian Gulf in mid-2025, Reuters.com, analysts feared a blockade that could cut off one‑fifth of global oil and LNG flow, seia.gov. The Suez Canal and Bab al‑Mandeb are others: attacks on shipping in these regions by Houthi rebels have already prompted Saudi Arabia to reroute oil through its East‑West pipelineeia.gov. At the same time, new pipelines and export terminals in Saudi Arabia and the UAE provide 2.6 million barrels per day of bypass capacity, which is insufficient to replace flows through Hormuz. A closure of Hormuz would thus create an energy shock reminiscent of the 1973 oil embargo.
On land, the Balticconnector and Nord Stream pipelines illustrate how terrestrial and subsea infrastructure are equally vulnerable. The 2022 Nord Stream explosions not only interrupted gas flows but also released vast amounts of methane. Subsequent incidents—damaged cables in October 2023, November 2024, and December 2024—show that sabotage may be an ongoing strategy rather than a one-off event. As the GMF report notes, most of the vessels suspected of dragging anchors over cables sailed from Russian ports and may belong to Russia’s shadow fleet. Even if accidents cannot be conclusively proven as sabotage, the pattern fosters mistrust and prompts costly security measures. Every undersea cable now resembles a tripwire: its severing may not cause immediate conflict, but it raises the temperature and could justify retaliation.
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3. Technological Arms Race: Surveillance and Resilience
In response to rising threats, states and companies are investing in surveillance technologies. NATO and the EU are developing new sensors to monitor underwater activity. Private firms offer satellite imagery and AI‑driven analysis to track ships and detect anomalies. RAND analysts highlight the need for attack submarines and patrol vessels to deter sabotage and to protect cable landings. The UK and Norway have commissioned specialised
surveillance ships to monitor critical infrastructure, theguardian.com. Meanwhile, energy companies deploy drones and remotely operated vehicles to inspect pipelines and cables. These measures represent a technological arms race in the maritime domain. The challenge is that defence costs are high and cannot guarantee complete security; even with sensors, a determined actor can exploit gaps, particularly in remote or contested waters.
Building resilience also involves redundancy. Europe is considering constructing additional gas interconnectors and storage facilities to reduce reliance on any single route. The EU’s plans include the Baltic Pipe connecting Norway to Poland and the South‑East European Gas Corridor bringing Azeri gas to the Balkans. However, new pipelines require years to build and may conflict with climate goals. In the digital realm, companies are laying additional internet cables along diverse routes to ensure that traffic can reroute if one line is cut. Some nations propose to store more data locally to reduce cross‑border dependencies. Whether redundancy will suffice to maintain stability in a crisis remains uncertain.
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4. Climate and Conflict: The Feedback Loop
Climate change is both a driver and a casualty of the new energy order. Extreme weather events—heat waves, droughts, floods—can disrupt energy production and transportation. For example, droughts in the Mississippi and Rhine rivers have impeded coal and oil barge movements, while heat waves have strained electricity grids. When energy systems are already under stress due to sabotage or trade wars, climate shocks can tip them into crisis. Conversely, conflict undermines climate mitigation: wars destroy infrastructure, divert investment and generate emissions. The sabotage of Nord Stream released methane equivalent to millions of cars. The burning of oil storage facilities after drone strikes sends plumes of CO₂ into the atmosphere. Thus, there is a feedback loop: geopolitical instability increases emissions, which in turn exacerbates climate impacts that further destabilise societies.
Anticipating this loop, some analysts call for a wartime climate mobilisation akin to the U.S. mobilisation during World War II. They argue that energy security and climate security should be integrated: investment in renewables not only reduces emissions but also lessens dependence on hostile suppliers. Climate adaptation measures—such as flood protections for ports and cooling systems for data centres—are also essential to protect critical energy infrastructure. Yet such integration requires political will and international cooperation. If states continue to weaponise interdependence, the synergy between climate and conflict will likely worsen.
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5. The Decade Ahead: Managing Risk and Building Norms
The coming decade will test whether global actors can develop norms and institutions to manage the pre‑war energy order. Some proposals include:
1. International agreements on critical infrastructure protection. Similar to treaties on space or the high seas, states could commit not to sabotage undersea cables and pipelines in peacetime and to cooperate in repairs. Verification would be challenging, but agreements could reduce ambiguity and provide a basis for sanctions.
2. Coordinated sanctions on shadow fleets. The U.S., EU and allies could harmonise sanctions against vessels participating in the covert oil trade. By targeting shipping insurance, financing and docking rights, they could make it harder for shadow tankers to operate. Sharing intelligence on vessel ownership and movement is crucial. The Friends of Europe report suggests that impounding suspect ships and insisting on transparent insurance could reduce the risk of sabotage.
3. Digital and cyber norms. Countries must negotiate norms against cyberattacks on energy infrastructure. The UN’s Group of Governmental Experts has attempted to establish such norms, but enforcement is weak. Given North Korea’s prolific hacking and the potential for states to disguise attacks via proxies, norms must be coupled with deterrence. Public–private partnerships should enhance threat detection and response. kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu.
4. Climate‑energy integration. Investment in renewables, storage and demand management should be prioritised to reduce reliance on vulnerable fossil fuels. International cooperation on critical minerals, including recycling and ethical sourcing, can reduce dependence on any single supplier. Removing trade barriers on clean technologies may accelerate adoption. The EU and the U.S. could create a transatlantic climate fund that ties tariff reductions to emissions targets, aligning trade with climate goals.
The success of these proposals depends on trust and reciprocity. If states believe that others will abide by norms, they are more likely to cooperate. Yet trust is in short supply. Building it will require transparency, confidence‑building measures, and perhaps third‑party verification. Without such efforts, the pre‑war energy order may devolve into open conflict.
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Epilogue: The Silence Before the Sirens
On the surface, the world appears orderly. Tankers glide across seas, their cargo worth more than gold. Undersea cables hum with data, carrying the lifeblood of finance and communication. Wind farms spin silently, pumping electrons into the grid. Leaders speak at summits about cooperation and energy security. Yet beneath this calm lies a pulse of fear. Every cable is a potential tripwire; every tanker a target; every software update a vector for malware. The term pre‑war energy order captures this uneasy equilibrium: no formal declaration of war, but a persistent sense that one miscalculation could unleash chaos.
The silence before the sirens is not the absence of noise but the hum of cables on the ocean floor, the whirr of pumps in LNG terminals and the quiet click of computer code executing in a hacker’s den. It is the sound of a world preparing for a conflict it refuses to name. The $750 billion energy deal was one such hum—a diplomatic signal disguised as commerce, a spark that could ignite broader tensions. By tying Europe’s fate to American gas and by threatening Russia with ultimatums, the deal blurred the line between trade and war. The sirens have not yet sounded, but the cautionary tales of Nord Stream, Hormuz, the shadow fleet and cyber thefts remind us that the future may not be decided by dramatic declarations but by the unseen vulnerabilities of our interconnected world.
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Latest development and quote
As this essay neared completion, developments continued. On July 28, 2025, Reuters reported a rise in oil prices following the announcement of the U.S.-EU energy-and-trade pact and President Trump's shortened deadline for Russia. Market analyst Phil Flynn noted the geopolitical implications: The pact forces Europe to reduce reliance on Russian energy, boosting U.S. producers while pressuring Putin to negotiate. Flynn's analysis exemplifies this essay's core argument: energy agreements are not neutral transactions but tools of power and potential instigators of conflict.
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Sources and References
The discussion in this essay is underpinned by a broad range of contemporary news reports, policy briefs and academic analyses published between 2023 and 2025. Keywords are listed here in Harvard style.
Reuters (2024a) ‘EU’s $750 billion energy pledge faces scepticism’. Reuters, 2024. The report explores the proposed EU‑U.S. energy deal and notes that analysts doubt the feasibility of tripling U.S. energy imports to reach the $750 billion target.
Reuters (2024b) ‘US slaps steep tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and solar panels’. Reuters, September 2024. This article details Washington’s 100% tariff on Chinese EVs and other trade measures that escalated tensions in clean-tech supply chains.
Reuters (2025a) ‘Oil rises 2% on US‑EU trade deal; Trump shortens deadline for Russia’. Reuters, 28 July 2025. This piece reports on the announcement of the EU‑U.S. trade pact and includes analyst Phil Flynn’s observation that Europe will “have to give up a big percentage of everything they’re getting from Russia”, reuters.com.
The Washington Post/Associated Press (2025) ‘Trump gives Russia 10 days to end Ukraine war. The Washington Post, July 2025. This article recounts the ultimatum delivered by U.S. President Donald Trump to his Russian counterpart and situates it within broader trade‑and‑energy negotiations.
Euronews (2025) reported in April that LNG surpassed pipeline gas as the EU's primary source of gas imports, also discussing its environmental impact (euronews.com).
Bruegel's 2024 analysis, "Europe's changing gas mix," examines Norway's displacement of Russia as the EU's top gas supplier and the increased reliance on seaborne imports (bruegel.org).
Clean Energy Wire (2023) ‘Germany builds LNG terminals to cut Russian dependence’. Clean Energy Wire, May 2023. This factsheet explains Germany’s rapid deployment of floating LNG terminals and debates their necessity given long‑term decarbonisation goals, cleanenergywire.org.
Crossdock Insights (2025) ‘Critical minerals and China’s refining dominance’. Cross-Border Insights, March 2025. The briefing notes that China refines the majority of the world’s nickel, lithium, cobalt and copper and discusses Western efforts to diversify supply chains.
International Institute for Strategic Studies (2024) ‘EU provisional tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles’. IISS Strategic Comment, October 2024. This commentary examines the European Commission’s provisional duties on Chinese EVs and the potential for retaliatory tariffs.
RAND Corporation (2025). Protecting critical undersea infrastructure. RAND Commentary, July 2025. The analysis discusses the vulnerability of undersea cables that transmit approximately $9 trillion of trade per day and recommends increased surveillance and patrols.
The Guardian (2023) ‘Nord Stream blasts expose western vulnerability’—The Guardian, October 2023. The article details how the sabotage of Nord Stream pipelines and subsequent drone sightings around oil rigs spurred NATO countries to protect undersea energy and communications infrastructure. theguardian.com.
German Marshall Fund (2025) ‘Grey‑zone incidents in the Baltic Sea’. GMF Policy Brief, January 2025. This brief catalogues damage to Baltic gas pipelines and telecommunications cables in 2023–24 and explores suspicions that commercial vessels from Russian ports were involved.
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2024) ‘World oil transit chokepoints’. EIA, 2024. The report underscores the strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz, through which about one‑fifth of global oil and LNG trade flows.
United Nations Panel of Experts (2024) ‘Investigation of North Korean cyberattacks’. UN Security Council, Sanctions Committee, 2024. The panel’s findings, reported by Reuters, reveal that Pyongyang’s hacking of cryptocurrency firms raised around $3 billion to fund its weapons program.
Observer Research Foundation (2024) ‘North Korea’s cyber strategy’. ORF Issue Brief, November 2024. The brief analyzes the growth of North Korea’s cyber workforce and its use of digital theft to finance nuclear development.
Regional Energy Report (2025) ‘Turkey’s gas‑hub ambitions’. Regional Energy Analysis, July 2025. The report notes that Turkey’s domestic production covers only 4 % of its gas consumption, while its storage and export capacities fall short of hub status.
Geopolitical Intelligence Services (2025) ‘Russia’s shrinking gas footprint in Europe’. GIS Dossier, February 2025. The dossier charts the collapse of Russian pipeline exports and the rise of U.S. LNG in Europe’s gas mix.
Kleinman Centre for Energy Policy. (2025, May). Subsea sabotage: Implications for energy security. Kleinman Centre Policy Digest. Argues for treating sabotage threats to pipelines and cables as seriously as supply security issues and advocates public-private monitoring arrangements (kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu).
Germán & Co. (2024) ‘Prigozhin’s lesson for Trump & Co: Don’t trust Putin’s promises’. German Toro Ghio Blog, 26 August 2024. This analysis reflects the naivety of trusting authoritarian leaders and is referenced in the abstract as an illustration of the dangers of idealistic approaches to energy geopolitics.
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